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Abstract
This thesis departs from a neorealist  theoretical  perspective but adds a rational 
actor  perspective  based  on  game  theory.  It  shares  Waltz'  assumption  of  deep 
anarchy and the need for states to ensure their security but also maintains that 
actor prospects may be able to cope with the structural incentives in a flexible 
manner.  Two cases  of  international  politics  are  studied;  1890-1911 and 2001-
2009. It  is then argued that  the historical  case can provide a basis  for limited 
probabilistic generalization about the use of hard power in a modern multipolar 
setting using a methodological approach based on the concept of transferability. 
The underlying assumption is that the world may be headed for a multipolar world 
order and that some patterns related to the use of hard power from 1890-1911 
were being repeated in 2001-2009. The use of hard power manifests itself in two 
major ways; warfare and power projection. Multipolarity increases the number of 
actors that can use these instruments without implicit or explicit approval from 
another state. The differing actor prospects mean that some great powers are more 
likely to resort to hard power than others.
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1 Introduction
Realism is  characterised  by a  profound scepticism of  Enlightenment  liberalism's 
optimistic  belief  in  progress,  and has  a  more  pessimistic  view of  human nature 
(Hyde-Price 2008, p. 10)
The thesis departs from the notion that the world is in a state of transition between 
a  unipolar  world  order  and  a  multipolar  one.  Polarity,  in  this  context,  is  the 
neorealist  concept  of  power  centers  in  an  anarchical  global  system.  This 
assumption of a shift in polarity is based on statements by reputable publications 
such as  The Economist (“Europe: A worrying new world order; Charlemagne”) 
and  International  Relations  (Scott  2007,  p.  33). This  represents  a  potential 
paradigm shift  and thus  requires  a  new understanding  of  the world.  My most 
immediate  concern  is  the  implications  this  process  may  have  on  the  security 
climate of the international system and if it has an impact on the risk of military 
confrontation. 
I argue in this thesis  that  neorealism,  augmented by a simple but effective 
game theory-based actor perspective, can provide a useful tool for analyzing the 
consequences  of  a  potential  shift  towards  multipolarity.  This  theoretical 
framework is tested on a historical  empirical  context  and applied to a modern 
context.
1.1 Puzzle
How  does  multipolarity  affect  the  risks  of  confrontation  in  the  international  
security context? 
I  assume  that  there  are  timeless  aspects  shaping  state  behavior  and  that  the 
constraints imposed on this behavior by the global world order can be similarly 
understood. Thus, I propose to analyze state behavior in a multipolar environment 
in a historical  context in order to develop the theoretical  tools  required for an 
understanding of our contemporary situation. 
1.2 Ontology and Epistemology
In writing this thesis, I have an ontological stance heavily influenced by ”causal 
realism”, as defined by Brante (2001). Brante (2001, p. 171) states that a meta-
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theory should be ”as simple [orig. italics] and straightforward as possible, without 
therefore being unsophisticated”. His four postulates of causal realism serve this 
purpose well;
1. There is a reality existing independently of our representations or awareness of it 
(ontological postulate)
1a. There is a social reality existing independently of social scientists' 
representations or awareness of it (ontological postulate for social science)
2. It is possible to achieve knowledge about this reality (epistemological postulate)
3. All knowledge is fallible – and correctable (methodological postulate)
1.2.1 The Ontology and Epistemology of Causality
Brante  describes  his  view  of  causality  as  being  more  than  mere  regularities 
between observable  phenomena (Brante  2001, p.  173).  By this  positioning,  he 
distances himself  from classical  positivism.  It should be pointed out, however, 
that classical positivism is not the same as the guiding principles used in natural 
science today, which Brante (2001, p. 173) explains by mentioning two examples; 
the law of gravity and the concept of natural selection. Both are examples of non-
observable phenomena which generate observable effects.
Brante (2001, p. 174) also states that “causality should not be defined as law-
like universal regularities between observables A and B”. Instead, he argues that it 
could be “a causal relation that holds  sometimes  [orig. italics]” (Brante 2001, p. 
174). In addition, Brante argues that causality occurs as “tendencies [orig. italics]” 
since causalities can counteract each other, thereby altering the expected empirical 
effect.  Lastly,  Brante  argues  that  social  science  should  acknowledge  “causal 
capacity”. In a human being this can, for example, be the ability to work even if 
unemployed.  Brante (2001, p. 174) elaborates  by stating that “[i]nner capacity 
plus external situation explains propensity”.
1.2.2 Mechanisms
Brante adds the concept of “mechanisms” to the above described framework as a 
means of developing the concept of causality. According to Brante (2001, p. 175), 
a  mechanism is  “a  cause  that  has  a  (causal)  relationship  as  its  effect  [orig. 
italics]”. I consider this a suitable way of conceptualizing causal relations and will 
thus use the term “mechanism”, as defined by Brante, in this thesis. 
1.2.3 Structure and Agency
My view of structure and agency forms an important basis for my argument. In 
my view, structure  enables  and  constrains  agency.  This view of structure and 
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agency  is  described  in  detail  by  Sabatier  (1999).  Structure  is  in  this  context 
comprised of the international system. The actors are the nation-states.
1.3 Definitions
My definition of “hard power” comes from Nye (2003, p. 354-355). It describes 
“the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threat of 
punishment  of  promise  of  reward”,  i.e.  “the  ability  to  coax and coerce”  (Nye 
2003, p. 354). Nye also states that military prowess is an important part of the 
concept of hard power, along with economic threats and sanctions. The opposing 
concept, “soft power”, is described as “the ability to achieve desired outcomes 
through attraction rather than coercion, because others want what you want” (Nye 
2003, p. 354). 
1.4 Delimitations
This thesis is about international politics. It has a global scope but is primarily 
concerned  with  the  most  powerful  states  in  the  international  system.  In  my 
theoretical framework, this definition covers no more than a handful of the world's 
countries. The theoretical framework can potentially be applied to smaller states 
as well but these are not covered in the empirical analyses in this thesis. 
3
2 Theoretical Framework
The  theoretical  framework  for  the  thesis  is  comprised  of  a  structure/agency 
approach constructed using two different theories; one to account for structure and 
another to account for agency. The ambition is to create a combined theoretical 
approach in the neorealist tradition.
Structure is explained by neorealism, as developed by Waltz (1979). I have 
also  included elements  from  Hyde-Price  (2008)  to  get  a  contemporary 
perspective.  These  broad  theoretical  approaches  are  complemented  by  a  more 
specific theory within the same tradition,  being Christensen & Snyder's (1990) 
theory  on  alliances  in  a  multipolar  context.  As  indicated  at  the  beginning  of 
chapter  1,  the  choice  of  neorealism  is  primarily  based  on  my  ontological 
precomprehension of the international system. 
Agency  is  explained  by  using  a  game  theoretical  approach  based  on  the 
concept of “iterated games”, as described by Axelrod (1987). 
The  ambition  is  to  create  a  comprehensive  framework  for  analyzing  the 
relationship between polarity and so-called “hard power”, more specifically how 
multipolarity affects the deployment or commitment of military assets in support 
of foreign policy. I argue that hard power is a factor in international politics and 
that in a multipolar environment, more actors can make use of it than in a unipolar 
or bipolar setting.
2.1 Neorealism
A government  has  no  monopoly  on  the  use  of  force,  as  is  all  too  evident.  An 
effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force[...]. A 
national system is not one of self-help. The international system is. (Waltz 1979, p. 
103-104).
According to Buzan, Jones & Little (1993, p.1), the realist school in international 
relations was revived by Kenneth Waltz in 1979 in his  Theory of International  
Politics. The term neorealism has since been used to describe Waltz' framework. 
Waltz (1979) introduced the concept that came to be known as neorealism in his 
1979  book  Theory  of  International  Politics.  Waltz  argues  that  international 
politics  can  be  interpreted  as  having  a  system  level.  This  system  level  of 
positioning  nation-states  is  independent  of  the  behavior  of  states,  being 
determined by arrangement rather than interaction (Waltz 1979, p. 80-81). 
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2.1.1 The International System of Self-Help
One of the characteristics of the system is that it is anarchical because there is no 
supreme authority governing the behavior of the states. A nation-state is on the 
domestic level hierarchical whereas the international system is anarchical. Waltz 
(1979, p. 88) states that in the domestic political structure, “[s]ome are entitled to 
command;  others  are  required  to  obey”  whereas  in  the  international  system 
“[n]one is entitled to command; none is required to obey”. 
In the words of Waltz  (1979, p.  91),  “[i]nternational-political  systems,  like 
economic  markets,  are  individualist  in  origin,  spontaneously  generated,  and 
unintended”.  Behavior  is  ruled  by  a  “self-help”  principle,  like  in  a  market 
economy, the main difference being that self-help actions in a market economy 
are generally restricted by legislation, whereas in the international system there is 
no such supreme authority (Waltz 1979, p. 91). The most important objective for a 
state  in  this  self-help  system is  survival.  Only by securing  survival  can  other 
policies be pursued.  Waltz also states that  survival is a basic drive in a world 
where the security of states is not assured, rather than a description of explicit 
policy (Waltz 1979, p. 91). Some states may wish to conquer the world, others 
may only be want to left alone, yet others may wish to merge with other states. In 
the  latter  case,  although rare,  a  state  may actually  prefer  such  an  outcome to 
survival  in  its  original  form.  This  and  various  other  forms  of  seemingly 
anomalous behavior can be attributed to the fact that no state is in possession of 
perfect information or wisdom (Waltz 1979, p. 92).
The essence of the above line of reasoning is, in my interpretation, that states 
can  never  be  completely  assured  of  their  security  in  an  anarchical  system. 
Survival becomes the most basic objective and one which all states regardless of 
government will have in common. The actions of states will to some extent be 
determined  by  this  objective,  expressed  as  a  need  to  achieve  security.  Waltz 
(1979, p. 92) describes this in terms of a structural selection, i.e. that the structure 
will  “reward” those who play by its  rules and “penalize” those who disregard 
them. Thus, for a nation to prosper, it must be tend to its security needs. The fact 
that  all  states  face  the  same  basic  challenge  has  made  them  functionally  
undifferentiated (Waltz 1979, p. 97). Thus, since states cannot fully entrust their 
security to others, they must all maintain some ability to fend for themselves. 
2.1.2 Causal Capacity & Balancing
Each state, to some degree, possess the ability to become a threat to another state. 
In  Brante's  terminology,  this  is  a  causal  capacity  inherent  in  the  nation-state. 
Because of this, each state must be mindful of its relative position vis-à-vis other 
states. Thus, even if cooperation for mutual benefit can be achieved, each state 
must ask itself, “Who will gain more?” (Waltz 1979, p. 105). Extended mutual 
benefit which results in unequal distribution can thus alter the relative balance of 
two states to an extent where one becomes a threat to the other.
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Shifts in power can occur when great powers attempt to alter the balance of 
power between them. Waltz (1979, p. 120-122) states that the concept of “balance 
of power” in the international system is surrounded by confusion and competing 
definitions. In broad terms, it deals with how states react to the growth of relative 
power in a single rivaling state. Waltz (1979, p. 126) states that great powers will 
tend  to  obstruct  the  concentration  of  power  into  a  single  state  or  alliance  by 
aligning themselves with the weaker side. The logic behind this behavior is that 
too much power concentrated in a single state or alliance is a bigger threat to their 
security than maintaining the status quo through balancing. Waltz (1979, p. 128) 
concludes by stating that “[t]he expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, 
will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way 
or another”. He emphasizes that  “balance of power” is to be understood as an 
outcome,  not  necessarily as an intention  on behalf  of  the units  of  the system. 
Waltz describes two types of balancing; external and internal. Internal balancing 
involves mobilizing the state's own resources whereas external balancing involves 
the formation of coalitions and alliances with other states. Both types of balancing 
are, according to Hyde-Price (2008, p. 49) “risky and costly”. Risky, because they 
may draw the  attention  of  the  dominant  state,  which  may decide  to  launch a 
preventive  attack  or  take  other  punitive  measures.  Costly,  because  it  requires 
considerable financial resources. 
In this thesis, I use the “balancing” concept in a broader way than Waltz by 
applying  it  to  a  context  in  which  a  single  great  power  is  not  rising  towards 
hegemony  but  rather  in  a  state  of  decline  from  that  position.  As  such,  the 
balancing efforts may not only be described as means to prevent a rising hegemon 
but also to overthrow a dominant state.
2.2 The Concept of Great Powers
Waltz (1979, p. 130-131) argues that the definition of a great power/superpower 
must be one of ”combined capabilities”. According to Waltz, ”economic, military 
and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed” since 
states will use their combined capabilities in pursuing their interests (Waltz 1979, 
p.  131).  However,  I  argue  that  this  dimension  lacks  an  important  ingredient; 
ambition.  A  powerful  state  can,  at  least  hypothetically,  choose  to  pursue 
isolationist  policies  and  thereby  have  a  minimal  global  impact.  Hyde-Price's 
(2008, p. 38) definition of a great power corrects for this mistake by counting 
three features; 1. substantial power resources across a range of capabilities, most 
importantly, military and economic. 2. a disposition to define its interests in broad 
terms  that  go  beyond  the  need  to  survive  in  a  self-help  system  [...].  3.  a 
willingness to pursue its interests, both vital and non-vital, using whatever power 
resources  are  most  appropriate,  not  excluding  military  force.  Furthermore,  he 
states  that  ”[m]ilitary  capabilities  for  both a  credible  national  defense  and for 
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power projection are thus a sine qua non1 [orig. italics] for great power status, but 
not sufficient” (Hyde-Price 2008, p. 38). 
A great power is thus a combination of assets and ambition. Just one of these 
two  factors  is  not  sufficient  for  great  power  status.  Hyde-Price  (2008,  p.  38) 
mentions two examples of powers during the Cold War, being West Germany and 
Japan, with great power capabilities but which lacked sufficient ambition to act as 
great  powers.  Hyde-Price  (2008, p.  38) states  that  these two powers refrained 
from using the ”hard power capabilities  that  give substance to  diplomacy and 
demonstrate resolve”. 
With the above in mind, I argue that features required for great power status 
can be summed up in two simple components; combined capability (economic, 
political, military) and ambition. The combined capability comprises the power's 
capacity  for  exercising  and projecting  hard  power.  The  range  of  this  capacity 
determines the great power's status; if it can only exercise hard power regionally, 
it can be a regional great power. If it can exercise power globally, it has the means 
required for a global great power. The second component,  ambition,  is closely 
linked to the previous one. A power with regional power projecting capacity will 
only be able to effectively support regional ambitions. A true global great power 
will require both global power projecting capacity and global ambitions. 
2.2.1 Capability Synergy
Buzan, Jones & Little (1993, p. 59) argue that the aggregation of capabilities into 
a  single  factor,  power,  blurs  the  image  and reduces  the explanatory power  of 
neorealist  theory.  I  argue,  however,  that  Hyde-Price  and  Waltz,  by  using  the 
aggregate measure of power, can capture an essential factor which Buzan et al. are 
bound to  miss;  a  factor  I  have chosen to  call capability  synergy.  I  argue that 
capabilities (which, for the sake of clarity, in this case can be said to be economic, 
political  and  military)  in  combination  with  hard  power  can  have  synergetic 
effects, i.e. the combined weight exceeds the sum of the parts. The synergy of 
power can achieve far more than the sum of its parts in the sense that deploying 
hard  power on a  global  scale  requires  such synergy.  The  wars  in  Bosnia  and 
Kosovo are good illustrations.  Despite  the considerable  economic and political 
power at the disposal of the EU, it was unable to achieve anything until traditional 
hard power assets were deployed in support of the policy goals. The US had to 
step in to provide sufficient synergetic capability by deploying its own hard power 
assets and by coordinating the assisting states, using the NATO structures.
For example, a great power with sufficient aggregate power can initiate a war, 
pursue it and then exploit the outcome (provided that the outcome is favorable) by 
utilizing a combination of its capabilities. The political capability is necessary in 
order  to  justify  the  action  and  to  pre-empt  potential  obstruction  from  other 
nations, which could otherwise cooperate in opposition, thus thwarting the plan. 
The  economic  capability  is  required  to  cope  with  both  potential  trade  losses 
1 Sine qua non [Lat.]; a condition, can in this context be translated as ”without which [the state] is not [a great 
power]”
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resulting from the termination of economic relations with the nation or territory 
under attack as well as bearing the cost of warfare. Finally, the military capability 
is required to attain victory.  Any of these three capabilities separated from the 
other could not have been used separately to partially achieve what a combination 
of them can accomplish. 
2.3 Definitions of Polarity
Since  states  are  in  possession  of  different  degrees  of  capability,  power  is  not 
equally distributed. Some will have more, some will have less. The most powerful 
nations tend to become key players in the international arena. The number of great 
powers define the  polarity in  the system (Waltz  1979, p.  129-131).  The polar 
constellations have different implications for the international system. Hyde-Price 
(2008,  p.  41-43)  describes  polarity  by  placing  it  in  four  different  categories; 
unipolarity, bipolarity, balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity. 
In a unipolar world order, a single state enjoys a significant position of power 
vis-à-vis the other great powers. Hyde-Price (2008, p. 42) argues that this state 
will be a “hyperpower” but not a hegemon. A true global hegemon, in the sense 
that a single state can suspend the state of anarchy in the international system, is a 
very unlikely phenomenon. The experiences with obstructive small states such as 
North Korea, Iran, Iraq and others seem to indicate that although a hyperpower 
has the potential  to pacify such states, the costs involved will prohibit  it  from 
doing so simultaneously on a global scale. Although the US could pacify Serbia in 
1999 as well as invade Iraq and Afghanistan, it could not simultaneously deal with 
Iran and North Korea.  Thus,  even in  a context  in  which a single  state has an 
extreme advantage in power, the role of global hegemon proved to be impossible 
to shoulder. On the basis of this argument, Hyde-Price's “hyperpower” definition 
seems  more  accurate  to  describe  unipolarity  as  we  have  experienced  it.  The 
hyperpower has significant room for maneuver and can to a large extent exercise 
power over the international arena, even if this power is not absolute (Hyde-Price 
2008, p. 42). 
In a bipolar world, two superpowers compete for power and influence. Hyde-
Price  (2008,  p.  42-43)  states  that  bipolarity  “tends  to  be  an  inherently  stable 
distribution of power”. The superpowers are not dependent on any single ally and 
can  exercise  a  moderating  power  over  states  under  their  influence  to  prevent 
confrontations.
In a balanced multipolar world, three or more great powers are in possession 
of  roughly equal  power.  Neither  power can  “make a  feasible  bid for  regional 
hegemony” and thus states “tend to emphasize security maximization over power 
maximization” (Hyde-Price 2008, p. 43). 
Under  unbalanced  multipolarity,  one  of  the  great  powers  is  significantly 
stronger than the others and can make a bid for regional hegemony (Hyde-Price 
2008, p. 43; Mearsheimer 2001, p. 44). This leads to a heightened sense of fear 
and suspicion, which prompts the great powers to pursue more relative gains. As 
8
great powers pursue power maximization, the situation is “primed for conflict” 
(Hyde-Price 2008, p. 43).
2.4 The Critique Against Waltz
Buzan, Jones & Little (1993, p. 150-151) describes the critique against Waltz as 
being  centered  around  his  inability  to  cope  with  the  phenomenon  of  rules 
established to govern the behavior of states. Buzan et al. (1993, p. 151), however, 
argue  that  Waltz'  analysis  can  accommodate  such  phenomena  by  making  a 
reference  to  game  theory,  under  which  both  cooperation  and  conflict  can  be 
understood using the same theoretical  model,  being in  this  case the Prisoner's 
Dilemma. This is particularly interesting since Waltz (1979, p. 109) himself also 
makes references to the Prisoner's Dilemma as an example of how states pursuing 
their own interests end up worse than if they had pursued joint interests. 
Buzan et al.'s use of the Prisoner's Dilemma is explicitly based on the concept 
of the “Shadow of the Future”. They state that:
Because  states  know  that  they  are  in  a  relationship,  the  threat  of  cheating  is 
diminished because a potential cheat knows that other states will reciprocate and any 
benefit gained by cheating will be short-run. Under these circumstances, cooperation 
can enhance the chances of a state surviving in the anarchic arena (Buzan et al. 
1993, p. 151)
Buzan et  al.  are  correct  in arguing that  this  illustrates  how cooperation  is  not 
necessarily impossible in an anarchic environment. However, they also neglect to 
discuss just how fragile this “Shadow of the Future” can be. Axelrod (1987, p. 
145) explains that an element of predictability is required for the “Shadow of the 
Future” to  appear.  Considering the anarchic  nature  of  the international  system 
with  the  addition  of  asymmetrical  gains,  the  suspicion  of  defection  from 
cooperation is never far away. This suspicion in itself can be enough to trigger 
defection and,  by the same logic,  if  one party suspects  that  the other  suspects 
(even on false grounds), then this prompts defection. 
2.4.1 Functionally Differentiated Units
Buzan  & Little  (2000)  have  criticized  Waltz  by  arguing  that  the  units  in  the 
international  system  are  not  functionally  undifferentiated.  I  argue  that  their 
argument  for  functionally  differentiated  units  is  unsubstantiated  when  their 
examples are subjected to empirical  scrutiny.  Simply stating that some nations 
adopted what Buzan et al. consider to be “specialized roles” does not imply that 
they  should  be  considered  functionally  differentiated  units.  The  empirical 
examples of Japan, Italy and Germany are drawn from a context in which they 
were  vital  parts  of  the  US-led  alliance  and were guaranteed  substantial  direct 
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military support  from the US in case of conflict.  They could thus adjust  their 
position accordingly.  In addition, Buzan et al. seem to conveniently forget that 
Japan has a large and very expensive military force at  its  disposal,  in relative 
terms  Japanese defense  spending is  comparable  to  that  of  China,  the  UK and 
France (Stålenheim,  Perdomo & Sköns 2008, p. 178).  Italy and Germany also 
have  significant  military  forces  at  their  disposal.  If  they  are  to  be  considered 
functionally differentiated, then why keep military forces at such levels? I argue 
that  Italy,  Germany  and  Japan  from  1945  and  onward  fit  better  into  the 
functionally undifferentiated unit mold than Buzan et al. would like to admit. 
2.5 The Structure-Agency Problem
In Waltz' original concept of neorealism, he argued that agency was not the sole 
explanation in international politics and that structure had considerable impact on 
situations in which outcomes diverged strongly from actor expectations (Waltz 
1979, p. 61-78). According to Waltz, the structure constrains the actors, disposes 
them towards certain actions and affects the outcome of interaction. 
Problems arise when agency seems to collide with the structural incentives in 
certain empirical cases. One example of such actions is that of the Axis minor 
powers during the 1930s/1940s, which chose to ally themselves with Germany 
rather  than  unite  with  the  Allies  to  balance  against  it.  Waltz  (1979,  p.  126) 
dismisses this type of “bandwagoning” outright, instead he argues that the system 
encourages balancing. Hyde-Price explains this anomaly by simply stating that it 
was a rational option for minor powers looking to increase their influence (Hyde-
Price 2008, p. 50). But why didn't more minor powers in the same situation side 
with Nazi Germany as well if it was such a rational way to acquire influence and a 
secure position in the future? A conceptualization of agency is clearly required.
Offensive and defensive realism have attempted to provide some answers to 
the problem of agency in neorealism. According to Mearsheimer and offensive 
realism, there are no status quo-pursuing great powers, except for the “occasional 
hegemon” (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 2). Rendall (2006) criticizes Mearsheimer for 
arbitrarily  selecting  belligerent  states  to  empirically  back  his  argument  and to 
counter  this  presents  four  empirical  cases  from 1814  to  1848  to  demonstrate 
restraint among great powers. According to Rendall, defensive realism should be 
considered a synthesis of realist and non-realist theories. He states that “[r]ealism 
predicts that states will respond as security maximisers to structural incentives; 
other theories explain when they do not” (Rendall 2006, p. 524). 
This does not sound like synthesis to me but rather an attempt to mix realist 
theories with non-realist theories in a tautological fashion; either a case can be 
explained by neorealism or it can be explained by something else. However, I do 
acknowledge that Rendall's demand for agency perspectives is sound and that the 
criticism  against  Mearsheimer  is  warranted.  Thus,  I  propose  an  approach  to 
structure  and agency in  realism based on an  actual  synthesis  as  opposed to  a 
tautology.
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2.5.1 The Interface of International Politics
I  argue  that  the  structure-agency  problem  inherent  in  neorealism  can  be 
approached by a single model (see figure 1). Structure exercises pressure on the 
agents but the policy of the agents also has an effect on the interaction between 
states.  The  model  is  based  on  Waltz'  assumption  of  a  deep  structure  that  is 
independent of interaction but still acknowledges the role of agency in interaction. 
Thus,  structure is  independent  of interaction  and interaction  is  not  determined 
solely by structure. 
The  interface  component  can  be  understood  in  game  theoretical  terms  by 
illustrating it as a repeating Prisoner's Dilemma (see figure 2). The relationship 
between  cooperation  and  defection  in  the  Prisoner's  Dilemma  illustrates  the 
pursuit  of  absolute  and  relative  gains  in  a  two-party  relationship.  The  payoff 
matrix is determined by the structure but the prospect of gains is determined by 
actor expectations.  As such,  the prospect of interaction for mutually beneficial 
absolute gains is determined by both previous interaction and prospects for the 
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Figure 1: The Interface of International  
Politics
Figure 2: Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
future.  This perspective is designed to take into account some of the criticism 
presented by Wendt (1992, p. 405) but in such a manner that it  can cope with 
situations  in  which prospects  influence agency without  aligning itself  with the 
constructivist perspective he suggests as a remedy.
The sum of past absolute and relative gains of a state in relation to the past 
gains of all other states thus equals its power. This fits well with the argument 
presented  by  Waltz  (1979,  p.  105)  stating  that  even  when  two  states  make 
absolute gains through mutually beneficial cooperation, both must be mindful of 
who gains more.  This sum of power can be interpreted as the outcome of the 
process of structural selection proposed by Waltz (1979, p. 92). States that can 
secure a large total of gains will achieve considerable relative strength and thus 
prosper. States that fail  to accumulate such gains will  be reduced by the same 
mechanism.
The model has several implications. First, it rests on essential components of 
the original Waltzian neorealism, being comprised of structurally undifferentiated 
units and deep anarchical structure. Secondly, it provides a conceptualization of 
agency related to such a structure. 
This conceptualization can thus account for the empirical anomalies used as 
illustrations by proponents of both defensive and offensive realism. The pursuit of 
status quo is based on the prospect that absolute gains will outweigh relative gains 
over time. The pursuit of relative gains, even at considerable risk, is based on the 
calculus of increasingly hostile relations, which undermine the long-term prospect 
for absolute gains. If a state is at a significant relative disadvantage, this will also 
be an incentive for the pursuit of relative gains vis-à-vis the rivals of the state in 
question, which will undermine cooperation for mutual benefit unless the payoff 
in gains is asymmetrical in favor of the underdog.
The above outlined approach can help explain not only incentives but also 
conscious  agency.  Even  if  the  incentives  favor  certain  behavior,  such  as 
balancing,  the  conscious  agent  may  draw  different  conclusions,  for  various 
reasons.  This was  at  least  in  part  acknowledged by Waltz  (1979, p.  92),  who 
stated that anomalies occur because states possess neither perfect information nor 
perfect wisdom. I argue that Waltz' perspective needs to be revised since perfect 
wisdom and perfect information are not the only factors in play. Actor prospects 
also come into play.
2.6 Maximization: Power or Security
The  most  important  objective  of  any  state  in  the  anarchical  system  is  self-
preservation, as stated above. Power is a means to achieve this end, but not an end 
in itself (Waltz 1979, p. 126) since increased power both may and may not serve 
that  end.  Depending  on  the  circumstances,  states  may  adopt  either  cautious 
security-maximizing strategies or bold power-maximizing strategies in order to 
increase  their  own  security.  Under  some  circumstances,  power-maximizing 
behavior  may  be  expected  to  invite  counter-balancing  or  pre-emptive  strikes 
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(Hyde-Price 2008, p.  33).  It  is  then more rational  for a state  to adopt  a more 
defensive  and  cautious  strategy  while  constantly  looking  for  relatively  safe 
opportunities to maximize power (Hyde-Price 2008, p. 33). The primary incentive 
is thus to maintain the status quo and increase power only when it can be done 
safely.  If,  however,  one  or  more  of  the  states  is  growing in  power or  has  an 
opportunity to do so, this may create an incentive for power maximization. The 
remaining states will then have to keep up with the competition and the primary 
incentive becomes maximization of power, even if it  brings higher risks, since 
these states may otherwise end up at a long-term disadvantage and thus at risk. I 
argue that in addition to this perspective, a similar situation could occur when a 
previously  dominant  state  is  in  decline.  This  may  invite  power  maximization 
because rival great powers may see this as an opportunity to exploit the weakness 
of the previously dominant great power before it can recover.
The choice between power maximization and security maximization is thus a 
mix of structure and agency in the sense that the choice is a result of structural 
incentives and actor prospects. If the actor prospects indicate a strong potential for 
peaceful  co-existence,  then  the  incentives  can  be  of  lesser  importance.  If, 
however, the actor prospects indicate that future security competition is likely, the 
incentives toward power maximization will be far more likely to influence the 
actions of the state(s) in question.
2.7 Polarity and Interdependence
Polarity is linked to the degree of military and political interdependence between 
the  states  in  the  international  system.  The  polar  constellations  have  different 
implications, as outlined below. 
2.7.1 Multipolarity and Military Interdependence
Waltz (1979, p. 138) states that with  less  [my emphasis] interdependence, “the 
system becomes more  orderly and peaceful”.  Waltz  (1979, p.  138) refutes the 
notion  that  interdependence  has  a  pacifying  effect  and  instead  states  that 
“closeness of contact [...] raises the prospect of occasional conflict”. Waltz (1979, 
p. 169) argues that great powers in a multipolar system have to depend on each 
other for stability and security. He states that “[w]ith more than two parties, the 
solidarity of a group is always at risk because the parties can try to improve their 
lots  by combining”  (Waltz  1979,  p.174).  In  order  to  cope  with  this  problem, 
nation-states seek to form alliances to pool their strengths against potential hostile 
coalitions. Waltz (1979, p. 169) states that “Great powers in a multipolar world 
depend on one another for political  and military support in crises and war. To 
assure oneself of steadfast support is vital”. The complication is that “[w]ith three 
or more powers flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity 
fluid and makes everyone's estimate of the present and future relation of forces 
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uncertain” (Waltz 1979, p. 168). Waltz also states that “[s]o long as the system is 
one of fairly small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the security 
of others” (ibid.).
Thus,  the  maintenance  of  alliances  is  vital  for  all  involved  parties.  In  the 
bipolar  order  of  the  Cold  War,  the  superpowers  were  so  militarily  strong 
compared  to  their  allies  that  the  loss  of  single  alliance  partners  were  rather 
insignificant in comparison. Waltz mentions France's decision to withdraw from 
NATO as an example (Waltz 1979, p. 169). Another, arguably better, example is 
the  break  between  Yugoslavia  and  the  Soviet  Union.  In  a  multipolar  order, 
shifting  allegiances  can  shift  the  power  between  alliances  considerably.  In  a 
bipolar  setting,  alliance  defections  are  unlikely to  cause any significant  power 
shifts.  Using this logic, Waltz argues that military interdependence is low in a 
bipolar world and high in a multipolar one (Waltz 1979, p. 169). 
This  increased  level  of  military interdependence  in  turn leads  to a  volatile 
international climate. When Waltz wrote about multipolarity and bipolarity,  the 
Cold War was still  in full  swing.  I argue that  his arguments  on bipolarity are 
largely applicable to the unipolar world order that replaced bipolarity after 1989. 
In  a  unipolar  world order,  the  hyperpower  need  not  rely  upon anyone  for  its 
security. At the same time, the hyperpower can rest easy in the knowledge that 
even if other powers unite against it, they will not be sufficiently powerful to pose 
a real threat. This created stability and predictability in the international system. 
However, if multipolarity returns, we may find ourselves in a considerably more 
chaotic world once again. After the relative stability of 44 years of bipolarity and 
(thus  far)  20  years  of  unipolarity,  this  could  present  quite  a  shock  to  the 
international system.
2.7.2 Multipolarity and Alliances
The military interdependence brought by attempts at balancing described above 
has an even more profound impact in multipolar world orders. Waltz (1979, p. 
166) states that “[i]n the quest for security,  alliances may have to made.  Once 
made, they have to be managed”. Christensen & Snyder (1990) states that alliance 
patterns  in  multipolarity  are  characterized  by  the  “chain-gang”/”buck-passing” 
dichotomy. “Buck-passing” is in this case means that a state leaves the work of 
balancing to other states, preferring to wait and see. This means that the state in 
question can get away with spending less and can take fewer risks. In the case of 
“chain-gang” behavior, states will form alliances even with reckless partners since 
these are considered to be vital to the security of state and the status quo. If the 
partner is then compromised, even reluctant allies are pulled towards the brink of 
war by the “chain” of alliance. In a worst-case scenario, such as the events leading 
to the start of World War I, states on two sides are pulled in as they are forced to 
support  their  alliance  partners  and a  war  no-one really  wants breaks  out  on a 
massive  scale.  Christensen  & Snyder  also  state  that  “chain-gang”  behavior  is 
prompted by a belief in short, decisive wars whereas “buck-passing” will occur if 
states believe that war will be decided by attrition.
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2.8 Hard Power Put to Use
I  argue  that  multipolarity  provides  more  opportunities  and  incentives  for  the 
deployment or commitment of hard power than bipolar and unipolar world orders. 
I argue that hard power in support of foreign policy manifests itself in two major 
ways. Either it is used for waging war in a more or less limited fashion, which I 
call  splendid little wars, or it can be used as a show of strength and resolve, so-
called power projection. 
2.8.1 Splendid Little Wars
The term “splendid little war” was used by the US secretary of state to describe 
the  war  of  1898 between  the  US and Spain  (von Platen  1999,  p.  40),  which 
resulted in a swift defeat for Spain and considerable gains for the US. By virtue of 
not having one or two supremely powerful states,  multipolarity provides more 
opportunities for deployment of hard power. In a bipolar world order, any state 
must  take the potential  reaction of either  one or both of the superpowers into 
account before deploying hard power in the international arena (Waltz 1979, p. 
170-171). It is quite telling that the war between Egypt and Israel 1973 ended 
after  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  US  had  agreed  on  the  terms  of  a  cease-fire 
(Dunstan 2007, p. 181). According to one source, a former Israeli president and 
head  of  Israeli  military  intelligence,  the  Soviet  Union  played  a  key  role  in 
instigating the war of 1973 as well as ending it by stepping in to “save” the Arab 
states fighting against Israel (Herzog 1975, p. 285). 
In a bipolar setting the superpowers can engage in military operations without 
any implicit consent from another state but must then be mindful of the response 
from the rival. The US invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 as well 
as  the  Soviet  invasions  of  Hungary  in  1956  and  Czechoslovakia  in  1968  all 
qualify as potential examples of “splendid little wars”. Any other state planning a 
splendid  little  war  in  a  bipolar  setting  must  take  the  attitudes  of  the  two 
superpowers into account.  An example of this is the 1982 Falklands war.  The 
Argentinians went to great efforts to make sure that their war plans would not 
provoke a response from any of the two superpowers well before they started the 
campaign (Hastings & Jenkins 2005, p. 68f). 
In a unipolar setting, anyone interested in waging war will have to take into 
account  that  the  hyperpower  may  respond unfavorably  and thus  the  endeavor 
could lead to disaster. In a multipolar world order, however, there is more room 
for maneuver. A great power can use warfare as a means of making relative gains 
as long as it can be somewhat certain that the other great powers will not combine 
forces to prevent it. Wars are thus not as risky projects as they are in bipolar or 
unipolar settings. A great power in a multipolar environment will likely find more 
opportunities to engage in this type of warfare without placing its vital security 
interests at risk. 
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In a multipolar setting, effective deterrence requires that a number of great 
powers must be ready to take action against a state that uses hard power as an 
instrument of international politics if no single state is strong enough in relative 
terms to act as an effective deterrence alone. An opportunist state can thus exploit 
disunity among great powers to make a grab for itself. Waltz (1979, p. 171) states 
that  this  was  the  case  with  Hitler's  international  maneuvers  in  the  years  and 
months before World War II; the perception that no united opposition would form 
inspired  bold  behavior.  In  hindsight,  Hitler's  assessment  was  not  entirely 
incorrect,  he  did  after  all  manage  to  achieve  a  number  of  successes  in  the 
Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia as well as blatantly disregard the peace 
agreement of 1918. 
Disunity  thus  creates  an  opening  for  more  flexible  use  of  hard  power  in 
international politics. In cases where there is little international commitment and a 
readiness to deliver a quick response, a state can act swiftly and present the rest of 
the world with a fait accompli. 
Using the capability synergy factor, a successfully waged war can establish 
foreign policy goals despite opposition, secure access to resources and increase 
international  prestige  faster  and  more  effectively  than  any  of  the  capabilities 
required for such pursuits can achieve separately. Thus, there is a synergetic effect 
involved in producing this outcome. The possession of such a capability can act as 
a  deterrent  in  itself.  Waging  war  can  of  course  also  result  in  catastrophic 
consequences for the opportunistic instigator, for example the instigator may find 
itself fighting a bloody war of attrition for several years. 
2.8.2 Power Projection
The concept of power projection is well established in military discourse but quite 
absent in theoretical literature on international relations. Although the lack of a 
definite definition of the term results in somewhat arbitrary use, it can roughly be 
defined as the ability to exercise hard power over distance, often in a symbolic 
fashion  (see  for  example  Barrie  2007).  In  the  old  days,  this  was  frequently 
described as “gunboat diplomacy” since it was often linked to the deployment of 
naval hard power in support of the great powers' foreign policies. In a modern 
context, the term also includes aircraft (for an example, see Bradley 2009). By 
sending military forces, usually naval assets, to a specific area, a great power can 
demonstrate resolve. This is a strategy commonly employed by the US. Another 
application of the same concept is to send military aircraft on long-range flights to 
approach the airspace of neighboring states to demonstrate one's reach, which is 
frequently used by Russia. 
Power  projection  over  considerable  distance  has  traditionally  been  a  tool 
available only to the great powers because of the costs and difficulties involved. 
Smaller  states  such  as  India  and  Pakistan  have  also  made  power  projection 
demonstrations by testing long-distance missiles but in their case the ability is 
blunt and thus serves more as a deterrence. A nation that can, on the other hand, 
demonstrate its ability to deploy traditional hard power assets over vast distances 
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can try to use this to sway foreign policy makers in a desired direction through 
intimidation or by demonstrating support. Whereas missiles can be used for little 
more  than  to  wreak  havoc,  traditional  forces  can  be  used  in  a  more  nuanced 
fashion. 
Power projection can also bring risks. When a naval vessel or military aircraft 
appear, forces from two sides may find themselves in a stand-off. If, at that point, 
a single soldier, pilot or sailor opens fire on his or her own initiative, deliberately 
or  by  mistake,  the  situation  could  escalate  into  a  mutually  undesirable 
confrontation. 
2.9 Norms and International Regimes
A stable balance of power between the system's most powerful actors is thus the 
basis  of  international  order,  within  which  minor  powers  can  manoeuvre  to  gain 
advantages,  and  upon  which  arrangements  for  international  'governance'  can 
develop. If power is balanced, then a rudimentary 'society of states' can emerge, in 
the  minimalist  sense  of  a  basic  understanding  between  major  powers  of  the 
advantages of cooperation for system maintenance and milieu-shaping (Hyde-Price 
2008, p. 40).
From  a  purely  neorealist  perspective,  there  is  little  room  for  norms  and 
international  governance  within the system of  states.  Hyde-Price,  in  his  quote 
above, presents a neorealist perspective on these matters. The presence of norms 
and international governance in the public debate in the 1990s and 2000s cannot 
be denied or declared to be irrelevant. However, the context in which this was 
debated needs to be considered. In the unipolar world order of the post-Cold War 
setting, the extremely asymmetric power superiority of the US backed a set of 
norms and promoted a kind of international governance. It suited, or at least did 
not collide with, the security interests  of the hyperpower.  Some states may be 
more inclined to genuinely support norms concerning human rights and justice, 
while  some  may  be  doing  little  more  than  paying  lip-service  to  these  ideals, 
depending on the orientation of the domestic policy makers. However, I argue that 
this context cannot be put in a linear perspective, as suggested by the neoliberal 
dogma (as defined by Dunne 2005, p 186). 
Hyde-Price (2008, p. 34) describes the concept of “second-order concerns”, 
which  covers  “a  range  of  moral  and  ethical”  concerns,  “from  protecting  the 
environment to international human rights”. Thus, a neorealist can acknowledge 
that such factors may have an influence on foreign policy. However, this is under 
the condition that they do not collide with the security interests of the state. 
Alliance-building is a particularly problematic aspect for norms. Waltz (1979, 
p. 166) states that “[i]f pressures are strong enough, a state will deal with almost 
anyone”, citing the examples of the French-Russian alliance before World War I 
and the German-Soviet alliance of 1939. This view is supported by Mearsheimer 
(2001, p. 47). 
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2.10 Theoretical Summary
Unipolar  and  bipolar  environments  both  have  constraining  qualities  which  are 
lacking in a multipolar context. In unipolarity, the hyperpower will be watching 
over (almost) everyone, working to maintain order according to its liking. This 
constricts  the  freedom  of  action  for  all  other  states.  In  bipolarity,  the  two 
superpowers  will  moderate  their  allies  while  the  remaining  states  will  be 
constrained by their need to maintain non-alignment and the potential threat from 
the  superpowers.  In  multipolarity,  neither  of  these  factors  are  present.  Under 
balanced  multipolarity,  relatively  peaceful  coexistence  and international  norms 
constraining state behavior can be achieved but if the balance is disturbed and 
unbalanced multipolarity appears, this can be shattered. An unbalanced multipolar 
setting  invites  power  maximization  and balancing,  either  to  constrain  a  rising 
hegemon  or  to  exploit  the  weakness  of  a  powerful  state  in  decline.  Power 
maximization can lead to intensified power projection and “splendid little wars”. 
Balancing  can lead to arms  races and alliances  with reckless  states as well  as 
chain-ganging.  Both these behaviors intensify the risk for both intentional  and 
unintentional armed confrontation.  Thus, unbalanced multipolarity is inherently 
the most risky of the four different polar constellations. 
Thus  far,  my  argument  is  based  on  the  ideas  of  well-established  authors. 
However,  I  argue  that  Waltz,  Hyde-Price  and  Mearsheimer  along  with 
Christensen & Snyder all neglect the actor perspective. Their arguments become 
de facto  deterministic  in the absence of actor analysis.  The actor perspective I 
suggest illustrates that even under unfavorable structural conditions, actors may 
choose to be more or less focused on relative gains. However, transcendence of 
significant  asymmetry  in  relative  power requires  a  very robust  relationship  of 
cooperation and prospects of trust and mutual benefit. A crucial component in my 
actor/structure model is that the behavior of the actors does not alter the structure, 
it merely tries to cope with it. 
Alliances  seem to  be  largely  unaffected  by  norms  even  under  the  best  of 
circumstances  and chain-ganging alliances  are  no exception.  If  dependency on 
allies can be expected to increase in an unbalanced multipolar world order and 
chain-gang  alliances  are  formed,  then  risky  situations  may  follow.  Power 
projection  displays  may  escalate  into  confrontations  or  contribute  to  rising 
tension.  Reckless  allies  pursuing opportunistic  policies  of power maximization 
through the use of hard power could trigger hard power responses from the great 
powers, drawing them info armed conflict with each other. If the escalation then 
cannot be contained, the consequences could be truly disastrous. 
It  does  not  take  a  bellicose  popular  opinion  or  power-hungry  autocrats  to 
provoke mutually undesirable conflict. All it takes is an unstable world order, lack 
of trust and the ruthless logic of the anarchical self-help system.
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3 Methodology
This chapter outlines the methodological approach and the manner in which the 
theoretical framework is applied to the empirical data.
3.1 Generalization and Transferability
Many authors (see for example Stake 2007, p. 22 or Eckstein 2007, p. 128) have 
raised  concerns  about  generalizations  based  on  a  small  number  of  cases.  I 
emphasize, however, that my study is not intended to generalize in a deterministic 
manner.  My ontological  stance,  based  on  Brante  (2001),  is  combined  with  a 
methodological approach presented by Gomm, Hammersley & Foster (2007, p. 
100-103). They state that  “lawfulness does not have to be deterministic,  in the 
sense that everything which happens could not have been otherwise; nor does it 
imply reductionism” (Gomm et al. 2007, p. 101). With this in mind, I will pursue 
generalization from a probabilistic point of view, i.e. I will attempt to find what 
Gomm et al. call “patterns”, which are “stable features of the world” (ibid.). The 
difference between patterns and laws is significant in the sense that patterns in this 
context  are  to  be  understood as  probabilistic  whereas  laws per  definition  lack 
exceptions and fluctuations. 
A second source of inspiration for this thesis is the concept of “transferability” 
as described by Lincoln & Guba (2007, p. 40). Lincoln & Guba suggest that a 
working hypothesis  can be developed from a case study and then applied to a 
different  context  provided  that  the  other  context  is  sufficiently  similar.  This 
degree of similarity is called “fittingness”. In this thesis, I conduct a case study on 
the  world  order  of  1890-1911 and then  argue  that  it  is  sufficiently  similar  to 
today's situation to be transferable to a modern context. Thus, I have developed a 
working hypothesis  using the historical  precedent and then transferred it to the 
modern context. While Lincoln & Guba reject generalization outright, I have used 
this term in my argument,  since I agree with Gomm et al.  that  the concept of 
transferability in itself implies a probabilistic form of generalization. 
One critical view of the concept of transferability presented by Gomm et al. 
(2007,  p.  101-102)  concerns  the  selection  of  cases.  They argue  that  selection 
according to similarity means that generalization is implicitly being “smuggled in 
via the back door” and that these assumptions ought to be subjected to empirical 
testing  (Gomm et  al.  2007,  p.  102).  I  have  chosen  to  take  this  criticism into 
account in my design in two ways; first, by subjecting both my cases to a measure 
of  empirical  “testing”  and  second,  by  explicitly  discussing  my  generalization 
ambitions. It should be noted that “testing” is a difficult concept to incorporate in 
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this context, the nature of this methodological approach does not lend itself to 
strict  “testing”.  This working hypothesis  is however, in a manner of speaking, 
“tested” on the second case.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
The empirical  analysis in my thesis is comprised of two case studies. The first 
case study deals with the situation 1890-1911 and forms the basis of my working 
hypothesis.  The time frame of the first case is intended to cover a time period 
starting with the forced retirement of Bismarck as head of German foreign policy, 
which  heralded  the  beginning  of  a  more  aggressive  German  behavior.  The 
historical case ends in 1911 with the Second Moroccan Crisis, which was a major 
international crisis that greatly increased international tensions. This time period 
saw the modern era  born in terms of society,  globalization  and economy.  The 
second case study is a “snapshot” of the contemporary unipolar/multipolar gray 
area. The time frame of the second case is intended to cover a time period starting 
with 9/11, ending close to the time of writing, during a global economic recession. 
This  time  frame  saw  the  decline  of  the  American  “unipolar  moment”,  a  re-
emerging Russia and extensive violations of human rights by its most prominent 
self-proclaimed protector, the US. Empirical material will be drawn from 2001-
2009.
The primary purpose of the historical case study is to provide the empirical 
material on which to apply the theoretical framework and thus add perspectives to 
the  working hypothesis.  The  modern  case  study then shows how the  working 
hypothesis can be used to explain contemporary events.
3.2.1 Case Selection Criteria
The puzzle and purpose used as point of departure for the thesis has provided the 
criteria  for  case  selection.  The  primary  purpose  is  to  study  the  impact  of 
multipolarity on international security and thus to analyze incentives associated 
with multipolarity that could be potentially hazardous to the international security 
environment. In order to get a contemporary perspective, one of my cases is the 
2001-2009  time  period.  In  order  to  provide  empirical  illustration  for  my 
theoretical framework, I needed to choose a multipolar case similar to this time 
period. Since I intend to argue for transferability, I chose to study 1890-1911. It is 
the global case of multipolarity that lies most closely to the contemporary context 
in chronological terms while being similar in terms of interdependence, which is 
why I consider it preferable to the more recent 1920s-1940s. The two cases will be 
compared,  the  similarities  as  well  as  the  estimated  impact  of  the  differences 
provide the basis for the transferability argument. 
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3.2.2 Thematic Investigation
The empirical material will be investigated from a thematical point of view. Each 
case will be illustrated by dividing it into four theoretical themes; 1. Structural 
Incentives, 2. Power Maximization, 3. Power Projection and 4. “Splendid Little 
Wars”.  The  first  theme  will  illustrate  how  the  polarity  affects  the  structural 
incentives. The second theme will investigate actor responses to this incentive by 
making use of a synthetic actor/structure model. The third and fourth themes will 
study two different empirical phenomena linked to the use of hard power. 
3.3 Methodological Causality
The mechanisms that I argue can explain state behavior are structural incentives 
and actor prospects. These two factors qualify as mechanisms by being causes 
which  have  causal  relationships  as  their  effects.  For  example,  if  unbalanced 
multipolarity leads to more aggressive foreign policy behavior among the states 
and  an  increased  tendency  to  use  hard  power,  then  this  causal  relationship 
(unbalanced  multipolarity  –  aggressive  foreign  policy/hard  power  use)  can  be 
explained by two mechanisms working together, being structural incentives and 
actor prospects. Both of these mechanisms are “structurally dependent” (Brante 
2001,  p.  175)  in  the  sense  that  they  depend  on  “a  comparatively  durable 
configuration of elements”, being the structure of deep anarchy and the rational 
preference to maximize gains, and thus fulfill the key criteria outlined by Brante 
(2001). 
These two mechanisms explain causality in terms of structure and agency by 
emphasizing that the latter is enabled and restrained by the former. Structure and 
agency may be described as being mutually constitutive in the sense that they 
depend on each other for existence, although this is a result of arrangement rather 
than interaction. As such, even though the system may be said to be constructed 
rather than exogenously given, saying that it is being constantly reproduced gives 
a false impression of fluctuation. The extreme inertia inherent in the international 
structure is such that for all intents and purposes it may be considered a constant. 
Polarity is  the result  of  agency but also of the structure of deep anarchy.  The 
structure of deep anarchy itself is not affected by interaction. Even though it can 
be suspended by the hierarchy imposed by hegemony, which is a result of agency, 
it  will  return  as  soon  as  hegemony  ceases.  As  such  it  is  stable  and  nearly 
independent of interaction even if it can be affected by it, being constantly latent 
when it is not present. Only agency in the form of a drastic transformation of the 
international system, overthrowing the Westphalian arrangement of states as we 
know it, can change this structure. Such an event is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future and as such is not considered a factor of importance in this thesis.
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3.4 Possibilities and Limitations
The methodological approach described in this paper links empirical illustration to 
my theoretical framework, thus it should strengthen the plausibility of the theory. 
The transferability approach limits  generalization to the two selected cases but 
this is not of immediate concern to me since the nature of the phenomena studied 
limits the number of cases over time (time is the only separating dimension since 
two world orders obviously cannot exist simultaneously). Thus, if my theoretical 
framework is sound, it could potentially be applied to another context via another 
transferability study but that is outside the scope of this thesis.
3.5 Material
The empirical material has been gathered primarily from secondary sources, with 
a few primary sources in specific cases. The literature has been reviewed critically 
to reduce potential bias and the normal procedures for source criticism have been 
applied.  As  such,  all  material  has  been  critically  analyzed  to  cope  with  bias, 
tendentious  content,  outright  errors,  exaggerations,  propaganda  and  lies. 
Considering  the  purpose  and scope  of  this  thesis,  I  do  not  think  that  a  more 
extensive  use  of  primary  sources  would  provide  any significant  difference  in 
quality.
3.6 Methodological Summary
The methodological framework outlined above is intended to be able to answer 
the question while taking the ontological and epistemological assumptions into 
account. Brante's postulates, in combination with Sabatier's view of structure and 
agency, have provided the guidelines for the methodological design as well as the 
theoretical  framework.  Structure,  even  though  it  is  not  exogenously  given,  is 
subjected to such a degree of inertia that it may be conceptualized as being stable 
and  independent  of  interaction.  Agency  can  be  conceptualized  as  being  the 
constant activity required by states in order to cope with the challenges posed by 
the structure. Differences in these coping strategies, for example the difference 
between peaceful status quo pursuits and aggressive attempts to grab power, are 
not  the  same  as  fluctuations  in  structure.  The  structure  presents  a  constant 
challenge  to  the  agents.  The  neoliberal  idea  of  linear  development,  “end  of 
history”, etc. is thus not supported. 
The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  not  to  establish  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions  and  to  thus  prove the  theory  correct.  It  would  simply  be  folly  to 
attempt to isolate variables in such complex cases as those studied in this context. 
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Instead, I have chosen a different approach by arguing for transferability. If some 
intervening  variables  are  having  a  hidden  impact  on  the  first  case,  then  the 
similarity between the cases may mean that they are carried over as well. Thus, I 
do  not  intend to  prove  that  my theoretical  framework is  correct  but  rather  to 
provide a  plausible  analysis of the potential link between the use of hard power 
and multipolarity as well as the mechanisms causing this.
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4 The Case of 1890-1911
The 19th century saw the birth of the first true global economy,  one that could 
penetrate even the most remote corners of the world (Hobsbawm 1989, p. 87). 
After  a remarkable  period of growth and profits,  the world was hit  hard by a 
global recession in 1873. According to Hobsbawm (1989, p. 51), the crisis was 
felt  worldwide,  affecting  old industrial  countries,  colonies  and the  agricultural 
producers of the East and West Indies. This crisis had many dimensions. Deflation 
ravaged the prices, in Great Britain prices dropped by 40% in 1873-1896.  From 
the 1870s and on, the global  laissez-faire  trade regimes were gradually replaced 
by  growing  protectionism.  The  global  center  of  finance  and  business,  Great 
Britain, had to provide support to its banks in an attempt to cope with a growing 
international  debt  crisis  (Hobsbawm  1989,  p.  104).  This  economic  recession 
inspired the great powers to search for means of making relative gains since the 
economic means of acquiring absolute gains were diminishing.
1890-1911 was also an era of relative peace for the European great powers. 
Hobsbawm (1989, p. 392) emphasizes that peace was the “normal and expected” 
order  of things for people living in Europe.  Since 1815, there  had not  been a 
single  war  involving  all  the  great  powers  and since  1871,  no  European  great 
power  had  opened  fire  on  another  European  great  power.  The  43  years  of 
European peace in 1871-1914 stand out in contrast compared to the rest of the 19th 
and 20th centuries and the two destructive world wars. Hobsbawm (1989, p. 402) 
states  that  no  European  great  power  before  1914  wanted  a  war  with  another 
European great power, as indicated by the efforts to prevent confrontation during 
the crises of 1906 and 1911. That  a war might  break out was expected but it 
nevertheless took most of the world by surprise when it did. As late as 24 hours 
before the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, even a top-level US 
diplomat  and the  British  foreign  minister  were  convinced that  neither  France, 
Great Britain, Germany nor Russia wanted a war (Fromkin 2004, p. 109).
4.1 Structural Incentives
In 1890-1911, the multipolar  world order was dominated initially by six great 
powers, a number that  later expanded to eight.  The original six were: Austria-
Hungary, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia. The two additions 
were the United States and Japan. Of these eight, the UK was by far the most 
powerful in economic, political and several military (most notably, naval) terms. 
France, although in possession of a sizable colonial empire, was still weaker than 
Germany  in  most  respects.  Austria-Hungary  was  a  fragmented  realm  torn  by 
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internal conflicts. Italy, also recently united, was a new ambitious player on the 
global arena, eager to assume the role of a great power. 
In theoretical terms, the unbalanced multipolar world order was dominated by 
Great Britain, with several growing great powers at the horizon. Germany, Italy, 
Japan and the US were the most recent great powers and also the ones that were 
most eager to expand.
4.1.1 A British Perspective
Great Britain was the greatest of the great powers in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. The Royal Navy was unsurpassed on the world's seas and Great Britain 
was the global center of trade and finance. Being so dependent on trade, Great 
Britain pursued laissez-faire liberalism, stubbornly refusing to support tariffs and 
other  instruments  that  could  obstruct  the  flow  of  trade  goods.  According  to 
Fromkin (2004, p. 23), the UK was “the largest, richest and most powerful of all 
the great powers [my translation]”. The UK controlled one fourth of the world's 
surface and population and it had unprecedented control over the seas. In 1914 the 
British steam ship fleet alone (sailing ships were still fairly common) was 12% 
larger than all other European merchant fleets combined. The same year, France, 
Germany, the US, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland accounted for 56% 
of all overseas investment in the world while Great Britain alone accounted for 
the  remaining  44% (Hobsbawm 1989,  p.  73).  Great  Britain  dominated  global 
finance, making enormous profits on commercial and financial services, approx. 
137 million pounds sterling in 1906-1910. 
Britain was at the height of its power in 1890-1911. Although its industrial 
strength  was  about  to  be  surpassed  by  both  Germany  and  the  US,  it  still 
maintained an unequaled position in global finance and trade. Thus, it  had the 
strongest  incentive  to  maintain  status  quo  and  avoid  potentially  weakening 
conflicts.
4.1.2 A German Perspective
Germany, after being united under Prussian rule in 1871, had the strongest army 
in the world (Fromkin  2004, p.  23).  As a newborn great  power,  its  combined 
population, technology, military strength and wealth provided it with enormous 
potential. It was, however, at a disadvantage compared to the older great powers, 
which had already claimed large parts of the world. The Germans perceived that 
Germany's potential did not match its allocation (Fromkin 2004, p. 61f), thus it 
had a strong incentive for power maximization. The status quo-pursuing policies 
of the chancellor Bismarck, who had carefully governed German foreign policy 
for decades, were replaced by militant expansionist policies when Bismarck was 
relieved of his duties by the emperor Wilhelm II in 1890.
Bismarck  had  worked  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  in  particular  through 
diplomacy  and  alliances,  such  as  the  dual  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
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Russia, intended to preserve the peace between the two (Fromkin 2004, p. 24). 
With Bismarck gone, Germany started to pursue a more aggressive expansionist 
foreign policy, which included colonial conquests. In support of its new foreign 
policy ambitions, Germany also embarked on an extensive naval build-up. The 
German  navy  was  intended  to  become  a  powerful  tool  for  the  German 
government,  capable  of acting globally in force.  The strongly disproportionate 
strength of the British Royal Navy was thus challenged, which caused quite a bit 
of  alarm  in  the  British  government  and  provoked  countermeasures,  such  as 
increasing the number of Royal Navy ships in the home waters (Koenig 2004, p. 
146). 
4.1.3 An American Perspective
The United States was a growing empire which started to assert itself early. The 
unique geographical location of the United States meant that it had few rivals in 
its own hemisphere, which it was quick to exploit as early as 1823 by presenting 
the Monroe doctrine (Monroe Doctrine). This doctrine was intended to prevent 
any  further  involvement  from  the  European  great  powers  in  the  western 
hemisphere, thereby giving the US time and space to grow undisturbed until it 
was ready to make a serious grab for global power. Although not taken seriously 
at first, the Monroe doctrine became an important policy during the latter part of 
the 19th century when the US had grown into a true great power. The Monroe 
doctrine can be viewed as an attempt to preserve the status quo in the Western 
Hemisphere,  at  least  until  1904 when president  Theodore Roosevelt  added the 
Roosevelt  Corollary  to  the  doctrine,  explicitly  giving  the  US  sole  right  to 
intervene in the affairs  of the Latin American states,  “in cases of flagrant and 
chronic  wrongdoing” (Monroe Doctrine).  The US underwent  a transition from 
being worried about European encroachments to launching a power-maximizing 
campaign of its own, starting with the Spanish-American War of 1898.
The US, being a relative newcomer in terms of great power status, had an 
incentive to exploit this potential and take up a position closer to the older great 
powers. However, the US also had room to grow in its own hemisphere by virtue 
of  its  huge  land  mass  as  well  as  the  naval  ability  and  geographical  location 
allowing it to choose the weakened Spain as its opponent in its colonial conquests. 
As such, it could steer clear of the more infected great power conflicts related to 
the power maximization of the time. 
4.1.4 A Japanese Perspective
After the remarkable Meiji restoration of 1868, Japan was a rapidly industrializing 
nation, looking to the Asian mainland for room to expand. The Japanese secured a 
position in Manchuria and Korea, where it soon found itself challenged by Russia. 
The Japanese had anticipated conflict with France or Russia and thus pursued a 
vigorous naval build-up plan, which provided it with a powerful, modern fleet 
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(Koenig 2004, p. 122). Like Germany,  Japan was a newborn great power with 
huge potential and like Germany it soon found its ability to grow restricted by the 
older great powers, most notably Russia. The Japanese solution to this problem 
was to form an alliance with Great Britain in 1902, intended to secure British 
assistance in case Japan was to be attacked by an opportunistic great power while 
it was already involved in a war (Anglo-Japanese Alliance). The idea was quite 
obviously to plan for a war against Russia without having to worry about French 
interference since France and Russia were the two primary rivals Japan had to 
face (Koenig 2004, p. 122).
Japan found itself in a position similar to that of the US. Although it had to 
clash with Russia and risk confrontation with France, it could choose to expand at 
the expense of the relatively weak Russia while trying to maintain good relations 
with Great Britain and avoid angering France unnecessarily.
4.2 The Scramble for Colonies
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, all the great powers took part in an 
intense competition in which each tried to secure colonies. The global recession 
and the protectionism caused by it contributed to the situation. In 1897, the British 
prime minister expressed his sentiments to the French ambassador by saying; “If 
you hadn't been such stubborn protectionists, we wouldn't have to be so eager to 
annex new territories” [my translation] (Fromkin 2004, p. 93). Several old great 
powers, most notably Great Britain and France, had already colonized significant 
areas but even middle and minor powers such as Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands 
and Belgium had considerable colonial empires. The already partially colonized 
Africa was completely engulfed (save for Ethiopia and Liberia) by the imperialist 
great powers. In their scramble to grab territory, armed expeditions representing 
France  and  Great  Britain  collided  in  Egyptian  Sudan  in  1898,  sparking  the 
Fashoda Incident (Fashoda Incident). After a tense confrontation, it was resolved 
diplomatically through a negotiated division of the contested territory. 
Germany  entered  into  the  great  imperialist  conquest  race  after  Otto  von 
Bismarck was relieved of his duties as head of German foreign policy in 1890 
(Fromkin 2004, p. 16). At the same time, Italy was satisfied with trying to conquer 
overlooked, barren areas and eventually found itself unable to conquer Ethiopia.
Between 1876 and 1915, Great Britain increased its colonial possessions by 
some 10 million km² , France by some 9 million km², Germany acquired more 
than 2.6 million km² while Belgium and Italy seized nearly 2.5 million km² each. 
The US conquered approx. 250,000 km²,  mostly from Spain, while Japan took 
almost  as  much  from China,  Russia  and  Korea.  The  old  Portuguese  colonies 
expanded by about 750,000 km² (Hobsbawm 1989, p. 83). 
4.3 Gunboat Diplomacy
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The scramble for colonies led to confrontations, which sparked crises. While the 
Fashoda Incident was resolved peacefully quite quickly, two other crises would 
cause hostile attitudes that would linger for much longer. These are the First and 
Second Moroccan Crises, occurring in 1905-06 and 1911 respectively. During the 
First  Moroccan  Crisis,  the  German  emperor  denounced  French  influence  in 
Morocco and demanded an “open door policy” during a visit in Tangiers, thus 
presenting a direct challenge to France (Moroccan crises). This crisis was solved 
through  a  conference,  which  recognized  the  independence  of  Morocco,  albeit 
under French and Spanish policing, and the equal rights to economic access for 
the great powers.
Another infamous power projection incident was the so-called Anglo-Zanzibar 
War of 1896. Although a war by name, it was comprised of little more than a 38-
minute long bombardment of the royal palace on the island of Zanzibar in eastern 
Africa by the Royal Navy (The Anglo-Zanzibar War of 1896). The incident was 
sparked by a coup on Zanzibar, which made Great Britain react since its influence 
over the island was challenged by the usurper. 
The United States also did its fair  share of power projection, including the 
deployment of the gunboat USS Nashville to support the independence struggle of 
the Republic  of  Panama from Colombia  in  1903  (TR's Legacy -  The Panama 
Canal). The US launched another, more pompous display of power in 1907-1909 
when it  sent  a  large  fleet  with a core of  sixteen  new battleships  on a  voyage 
around the world in a “grand pageant of American sea power” (The Great White  
Fleet). 
The second Moroccan crisis in 1911 was instigated by the German move to 
send the gunboat SMS Panther to Agadir, ostensibly to protect German interests 
during local unrest. This excuse was not accepted by France and Great Britain. 
According to the New York Times, the latter contemplated a countermove in the 
form of a naval power demonstration (“Two War Clouds Menace Europe”). The 
crisis was later resolved through international negotiations which gave Germany 
some  strips  of  territory  in  the  French  Congo  in  exchange  for  recognition  of 
Morocco as a French protectorate (Moroccan crises). 
4.4 Splendid Wars of the Past
The 1890-1911 time period featured a  number  of “splendid little  wars”.  Short 
campaigns  with  limited  but  significant  objectives  yielded  favorable  results  in 
several cases and led to bloody wars of attrition in some. 
4.4.1 The Spanish-American War, 1898
The Spanish-American war of 1898 is an example of a successful war in which 
the  US  emerged  as  a  true  global  great  power  by  seizing  Cuba,  Guam,  the 
Philippines  and Puerto Rico from Spain in  a  swift  naval  campaign as well  as 
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annexing  Hawaii  (Koenig  2004).  The  war  catapulted  the  US  to  a  position  of 
significant  power  and  global  reach.  The  US  maintained  control  over  the 
Philippines until 1946, exercised considerable influence over Cuba until 1959 and 
still  owns  Puerto  Rico  and  Guam.  The  Spanish-American  war  yielded  few 
casualties  for  the  instigating  Americans.  Only  395  Americans  were  killed  in 
battle.  However,  several  thousand  perished  from  food  poisoning  due  to  a 
dangerous mistake at a meat-packing company in Chicago (von Platen 1999, p. 
40). This did not cloud the remarkable gains made by the victory. In Cuba, The 
American Tobacco C:o established a large-scale operation, Bethlehem Steel took 
over  most  of  the  production  of  iron  and steel  while  United  Fruit  bought  vast 
expanses of agricultural land at bargain prices (von Platen 1999, p. 40f). 
4.4.2 The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
In 1904, the competition between Russia and Japan over the control of Manchuria 
and Korea prompted Japan to resort to military action. Japan planned to destroy 
the Russian naval assets in Asia, which would secure the Japanese sea lanes and 
undermine the Russian ability to fight in the region. In 1904, Japan declared war 
on Russia and in 1904-1905 utterly crushed the Russian navy and defeated the 
Russian  army in  a  series  of  decisive  battles  with  few losses  of  its  own,  thus 
securing its own role on the Asian mainland (Koenig 2004, p. 129-144). 
4.4.3 The Boer War, 1899-1902
The British army found itself in a more difficult position in the Boer war of 1899-
1902.  After  setbacks  against  the  British  in  conventional  battles,  the  Boers 
switched strategy. Being expert marksmen equipped with modern weapons, they 
engaged the British forces in a guerrilla war that came to last for three years. The 
British responded with drastic measures and harsh policies towards the civilian 
population in order to secure their victory (Smedberg 2005, p. 348). There is no 
doubt that the British intended the Boer war to be a splendid little war. When the 
troops  were  ready  to  depart  from  Britain,  it  was  expected  that  they  would 
participate in a “tea-time war”, i.e. a war that would be won before the five-o-
clock tea (von Platen 1999, p. 111). After three years, 21,842 men had been killed 
in action or by diseases and more than 75,000 had been wounded. 448,435 British 
troops had to be dispatched to finally end the costly debacle (von Platen 1999, p. 
111f). 
4.5 Empirical summary: 1890-1911
Structural  incentives  were  not  the  only  factor  in  play  during  1890-1911. 
According  to  Fromkin  (2004,  p.  95),  Germany felt  that  it  was  threatened  and 
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encircled by France and Russia. The German alliance with Russia dating back to 
the days  of Bismarck  before 1890 was replaced  by intense hostility  when the 
Kaiser abandoned the status quo policy in favor of power maximization. The US 
and Japan found it easier to maximize their power since they could choose weak 
opponents in their own spheres of interest. Where the actors anticipated benefits 
from cooperation, such as the Anglo-Japanese agreement and the alliance between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  treaties  were  signed.  This  also  illustrates  the 
degree of military interdependence at the time; great powers could not afford to 
stand alone without guarantees of some sort. The German kaiser Wilhelm II said 
in 1908 that “we cannot afford to lose Austria, with its 50 million inhabitants and 
strong and effective army, but neither can we let it draw us into an armed conflict 
that...could lead to a large-scale war, in which we definitely would have nothing 
to gain” [my translation] (Fromkin 2004, p. 71). 
Interestingly enough, loyalties shifted with short notice. The Anglo-Japanese 
treaty could have brought Great Britain into open conflict with Russia or France, 
which it would later ally itself with. Hobsbawm (1989, p. 404) describes this by 
stating that the alliances of 1914 were impossible to predict in 1880. As such, both 
structural  incentives  and  actor  prospects  need  to  be  taken  into  account  to 
understand the policies of 1890-1911. 
The  growing  military  interdependence  manifested  by  the  alliance  treaties 
eventually brought the great powers into a chain-gang situation where Germany in 
1914 had to support Austria-Hungary while Russia had to support Serbia and in 
turn be supported by Great Britain and France. The chain-gang logic ultimately 
became one of the reasons for the number of states involved in World War I but, 
as illustrated by this case study, it posed a danger several years before that event. 
For all its perils, the time period between circa 1870 and 1914 became known 
as “la belle époque” [“the beautiful era”] after the Great War (von Platen 1999, p. 
76).  That  may  be  a  sign  of  how  the  time  before  the  war  was  romanticized 
afterwards by hazy memories but it may also show that the people who lived then 
genuinely thought that it was a time of belief in the future, faith in mankind and 
progress. Little did they know just what kind of path they were treading. 
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5 Working Hypothesis
This chapter briefly lists the assumptions of the working hypothesis based on the 
theoretical framework and the empirical data from chapter 4. 
5.1 The Risks of Multipolarity
The case of 1890-1911 illustrates how the unbalanced multipolar world order of 
the  time  inspired  the  great  powers  to  pursue  power-maximizing  policies.  The 
decline of the most powerful of the great powers and the lack of stable alliances 
created  an  opening  for  opportunistic  new  great  powers  on  the  rise.  When 
traditional diplomacy and negotiations did not yield the desired results, the great 
powers deployed hard power in support of their foreign policy objectives. This 
increased the risk of international confrontations. My working hypothesis is thus;
• Unbalanced multipolarity with a dominant great power in decline provided 
the incentive for power maximization
• Actor prospects that favored relative gains meant that the actors could not 
transcend the structural incentives through cooperation
• Opportunities to make relative gains without seizing them from another great 
power were identified in the form of annexation of uncontested territory
• The  simultaneous  attempts  to  secure  uncontested  territory  sparked 
“scrambles”  and  confrontations  in  which  hard  power  was  deployed  to 
demonstrate resolve
• Alliance patterns were unpredictable and based on short-term interests rather 
than ideological or normative concerns
• Hard power was used  as  an instrument  for  conducting  foreign  policy,  in 
particular in cases where traditional means did not yield the desired results
• Hard power was used in two ways; for power projection displays  and for 
instigating “splendid little wars”
• The potentially rapid unfolding of “splendid little wars” increases the risk of 
chain-gang alliance behavior
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6 The Case of 2001-2009
With the end of the Cold War, the US found itself standing strong but with no 
equals. Few if any would argue that the US has been the sole superpower since 
then, taking on the role of hyperpower and protector of the international system. 
As long as the hyperpower was looking over everyone's shoulder, multilateralism 
could  be built  on noble  foundations  and the world of  international  interaction 
seemed to take on a more just and peaceful nature. However, after September 11th 
2001, things have started to change.
6.1 Structural Incentives
After fighting two lengthy and costly wars in two distant theaters of operation, 
suffering  from  the  impact  of  the  greatest  economic  disaster  since  the  Great 
Depression  as  well  as  bearing  the  cost  of  a  global  ”war  on  terror”,  the 
international giant has been severely wounded. The US, while still the strongest of 
nations by a wide margin, needs to step back, tend to its wounds and cope with the 
financial crisis. A reduced US influence in the global arena leads to the possibility 
of  new  great  powers  emerging.  The  currently  most  plausible  contenders  are 
Russia and China. The EU is also in possession of considerable capabilities but as 
of  yet,  insufficient  coordination  is  preventing  it  from aspiring  to  great  power 
status.
6.1.1 An American Perspective
The US under George W. Bush abandoned the illusion of normative behavior by 
resorting  to  extrajudicial  extraditions,  torture  and  going  to  war  without  the 
blessing of the UN. Now the US is planning a withdrawal from Iraq and requires 
assistance from its  NATO allies  to cope with its  commitments  in Afghanistan 
(Whitlock  2008;  Erlanger  & Cooper  2009).  The  overstretched  American  hard 
power assets will need some time to recover from the drain of manpower and 
resources imposed by the lengthy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, those 
who think that US foreign policy will be considerably less inclined to use hard 
power  and  abandon  all  the  criticized  methods  employed  under  the  previous 
administration  should  consider  the  fact  that  after  only a  few weeks  in  office, 
President  Obama authorized  the CIA to continue  the controversial  extraditions 
(Burton & West 2009).
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At the same time, NATO remains one of the most important US foreign policy 
projects. The recent NATO expansion has brought the Baltic states of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania into the alliance.  Georgia and the Ukraine are also being 
considered for membership. This was previously an important objective for the 
US  administration  but  lately  the  process  has  been  bogged  down  by  internal 
disagreement,  the  European  NATO  members  being  particularly  reluctant  to 
support such plans (Dombey 2008).
6.1.2 A Russian Perspective
According to Fedorov (2002, p. 39), the unipolar world order and the dominance 
of the US is the main threat to Russia's national security. Multipolarity and a EU 
that is more independent of the US are identified as means to reduce American 
influence.  In  the  Russian  Foreign  Policy  Concept of  2008,  an  “emerging 
multipolarity”  is  mentioned  as  well  as  the  Russian  negative  view  of  NATO 
expansion, especially in Georgia and the Ukraine (The Foreign Policy Concept of  
the Russian Federation). Russia's ambition is to undermine the US power base by 
encouraging  a  split  between  the  US  and  the  EU,  intended  to  weaken  NATO 
(Fedorov 2002, p. 39). The multipolar view of the international system is also 
explicit in the Russian military doctrine (Ulfving 2005, p. 223). When the Polish 
foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski suggested that Russia join NATO, the Russian 
envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin replied that “Great powers don't join coalitions, 
they create coalitions. Russia considers itself a great power” (Pop 2009).
6.1.3 A Chinese Perspective
China  has  perceptions  similar  to  that  of  Russia  and  is  openly  supportive  of 
Russia's  ambitions  to  achieve  a  multipolar  world  order  (Isachenkov  2005).  In 
addition,  China  has  launched  an  economic  and diplomatic  offensive  in  Africa 
(Servant  2005) and is  pursuing military relations  in  Latin  America,  which has 
caused both John McCain and Hillary Clinton to express concern2 (Pessin 2006). 
Although China has been less confrontational than Russia vis-à-vis the US, it has 
also repeatedly warned the rest of the world that Taiwan remains a sensitive issue 
(ibid.)  and is  still  focusing on strengthening  its  military capacity  near  Taiwan 
(Pessin 2009).
6.2 The Scramble for the Arctic
The  “scramble  for  the  Arctic”  is  a  contemporary  illustration  of  the  conflict 
between  power-maximizing  and  international  norms.  Like  the  scramble  for 
2Both were senators at the time
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colonies of the great powers of the past, it's comprised of an attempt to secure 
resources which are, in a sense, “up for grabs”. The “Arctic Five”, being the five 
nations with territorial claims on the Arctic region (the U.S, Norway, Denmark, 
Russia and Canada), are in dispute over who has a right to which territory. In the 
summer of 2007, Russia sent a mini-submarine to the seabed to plant a Russian 
flag  made  of  titanium.  Canada's  prime  minister  Stephen Harper  dismissed  the 
event as a “stunt” but a few weeks later he announced plans for construction up to 
eight new armed Arctic naval patrol  vessels and a new deep water port in the 
Arctic (Sullivan 2008, p. 25; Cressey 2007, p. 521).
The year after, all five nations pledged to let the matter be settled by scientific 
criteria (“Race for the North Pole is cancelled”) but no more than a few months 
later, a Russian senior official stated that Russia was planning on increasing its 
military  presence  in  the  Arctic  and  that  Russia  has  “a  number  of  highly 
professional military units in the Leningrad3, Siberian and Far Eastern military 
districts, which are specifically trained for combat in Arctic regions” (“Russia to 
increase  its  Arctic  military  presence”).  The  importance  of  Arctic  oil  and  gas 
resources is indicated by the fact that Russia in 2007 began constructing two new, 
very large (70,000 dwt) arctic ice-capable shuttle tankers, intended to transfer oil 
between Arctic oilfields and a cargo transfer terminal in Murmansk. These will be 
the  largest  ships  ever  built  by  the  Admiralty  Shipyards  in  S:t  Petersburg 
(“Azipods: just add ice”).
The Arctic is not only of interest because of its potential oil and gas deposits, 
it  also  has  significant  strategic  importance  because  of  the  sea  lanes  that  are 
opening up as the ice coverage is being reduced by global warming (Yenikeyeff & 
Krysiek 2007, p. 9). The Northern Sea Route (NSR)4 and the Northwest Passage5 
could  become  new  alternative  shipping  routes.  The  NSR  could,  according  to 
Yenikeyeff  & Krysiek  (2007,  p.  9),  reduce  the traveling  distance  by 40% for 
voyages between Europe and the west coast of North America, Northeast Asia 
and  the  Far  East,  compared  to  the  traditional  routes  via  the  Suez  or  Panama 
Canals.  At  present,  the NSR is  accessible  only during the summer  but  global 
warming could make it open all year round in 20-30 years (ibid.). In August 2008, 
both the Northwest Passage and the NSR were open at the same time, for the first 
time in circa 125,000 years (Lean 2008). A German-based shipping group has 
reported that it will start using the NSR in 2009, thus reducing the distance of the 
voyage between Germany and Japan by some 4,000 nautical miles (ibid.).
The Northwest Passage is today covered in dense ice most of the year. Using 
real-time satellite images, it can be traversed, albeit with great difficulty, without 
the assistance of icebreakers (Behrend 2006). However, within 20-30 years, it too 
is expected to become passable without such assistance (Yenikeyeff & Krysiek 
2007, p. 11). The US and EU consider the Northwest Passage to be international 
waters but Canada maintains territorial claims on it, insisting that ships using the 
3 The Leningrad military district has kept its name even though the city of Leningrad is now called S:t Petersburg 
(Ulfving 2005, p. 89)
4 A.k.a. the Northeast Passage, a sea lane linking Europe with Asia via the Arctic waters off the northern coast of 
Russia
5 A sea lane linking the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic via the Canadian arctic archipelago
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passage should report to Canadian authorities, a policy expected to be opposed by 
the US (Lean 2008).
6.3 The Contemporary Gunboats
The scramble  for  the  Arctic  has,  like  its  historic  counterpart,  inspired  acts  of 
power  projection.  On  August  7,  2007  the  Canadian  armed  forces  launched 
Operation Nanook, described as a “sovereignty operation” (“Arctic sovereignty 
operation Nanook set to launch in Nunavut”). The operation lasted 10 days and 
involved  more  than  700  army,  navy  and  air  force  personnel,  along  with  30 
Canadian Inuit Rangers and members of the coast guard and various government 
departments. The operation supposedly revolved around a drug-interdiction and 
oil-spill scenario but in addition to the two navy surface vessels, a submarine and 
fighter  jets  were  also  deployed  (ibid.).  The  submarine  and  fighter  jets  were 
presumably part of the “sovereignty” ambition rather than Arctic drug-interdiction 
and environmental protection operations. 
This was not, however, the first power projection display in the north in 2007. 
The  same year,  the  Norwegian  armed  forces  observed an  increase  in  Russian 
long-range bomber sorties along Norwegian air space in July, following a major 
naval exercise in the area (Moskwa 2007). The Russian bombers deviated from 
the usual flight paths by going farther south than before, forcing the scramble of 
both Norwegian and British fighter aircraft (ibid.). 
In  the  South  China  Sea,  China  has  recently  engaged  in  power  projection 
against  a US intelligence vessel,  the  USNS Impeccable,  which was accused of 
spying by Beijing (Reid 2009). The  Impeccable  is equipped with an advanced 
towed-array sonar designed to detect submarines (Pike 1999). In March 2009, five 
Chinese ships “harassed” the Impeccable by maneuvering in a manner that forced 
the Impeccable to take evasive action to avoid colliding with them (Pessin 2009). 
The incident took place in international waters. In response, the US has dispatched 
heavily armed destroyers to protect the Impeccable from further Chinese actions 
(Reid 2009).
The restructuring  of  many armed  forces  today with the  ambition  to  create 
rapidly  deployable  units  for  peacekeeping/peace  enforcement  missions  abroad 
also  has  the  side  effect  that  it  provides  the  instruments  for  remote  power 
projection. Hyde-Price (2008, p. 124) states that Germany's restructuring efforts 
should provide it with “an enhanced capability for power projection” within ten 
years (i.e. by 2018).
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6.4 Splendid Wars of the Present
The  2001-2009  time  period,  like  its  historical  predecessor,  featured  a  few 
“splendid  little  wars”.  Again,  a  short  campaign  with  limited  but  significant 
objectives yielded favorable results in one case and led to a bloody war of attrition 
in another. 
6.4.1 The Iraq War, 2003-
The US, anticipating a swift victory, invaded the already weakened Iraq in 2003, 
with the ambition to oust its leader and replace it with a government more to the 
liking of the US. Like the Boer war, the initial successes in conventional battles 
were soon replaced by an atrocious guerrilla war in which the great power found 
itself pouring more and more funds and men into the conflict but with few gains 
to show for it. The war was instigated despite considerable international protests, 
including from the secretary-general of the United Nations (“Iraq war illegal, says 
Annan”). Rather than a “splendid little war”, the US found itself bogged down in 
a low-intensity war of attrition. Like its predecessor in South Africa, it not only 
has had to endure casualties and costs but also harsh criticism from around the 
globe. 
Although the Iraq war is not a “splendid little war” in the multipolar sense, it 
shows that “splendid little wars” was considered a viable foreign policy option for 
the US even at a time when it was met with considerable international opposition.
6.4.2 The Russia-Georgia War, 2008
The Russian war against  Georgia in the summer of 2008 is arguably the most 
clear-cut modern example of a successful “splendid little war” fought by a great 
power. Russia used its vast superiority in intelligence to prepare and plan for the 
expected  Georgian  move,  then  responded by using  massive  force  to  deliver  a 
devastating blow against Georgia. Russia was most likely expecting the Georgian 
move and had made extensive  preparations  for  it  (Clover,  Belton,  Dombey & 
Cienski 2008), including the deployment of troops to forward positions (Friedman 
2009). Russia seems to have had a long-term plan for this eventuality, since it has 
previously  targeted  Georgian  intelligence-gathering  assets,  for  example  by 
shooting  down Georgian  reconnaissance  drones  in  Georgian  airspace  (“Russia 
'shot down Georgia drone'”). The Russian campaign was thus most likely more 
than a defensive reaction to a Georgian attack. The war had all the hallmarks of a 
well-planned operation intended to deliver a swift forceful blow to show Russian 
resolve and strength. 
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6.5 Empirical summary
In 2001-2009, the structural incentives have undergone a change. Starting out in 
unipolarity,  the world has started to  gradually shift  towards multipolarity.  The 
reeling hyperpower can no longer maintain its steady grip and the emerging great 
powers have noticed that they can make a bid for power. While the EU remains 
ambivalent and divided, Russia and China seem to be repeating the behavior of 
their great power predecessors. The US is working to maintain the status quo but 
finding itself  more or less on the defensive,  while  Russia,  and to some extent 
China are trying in their different ways to reduce the relative gap between them 
and the US. Russia has shown once again that the risky calculus of “splendid little 
wars” can pay off and is now flexing its military muscle in the Arctic. China is 
maintaining more of a low profile but is nevertheless doing some risky power 
projection of its own in the South China Sea. In addition, China's plans for the 
future seem to involve increased Chinese influence abroad, while the conflict over 
Taiwan remains unsolved. 
If  the  transition  process  continues  and  the  US  finds  itself  becoming 
increasingly  incapable  of  asserting  itself  alone,  then  it  will  inevitably  become 
more dependent on its allies. These allies can use this to act more independently 
and pursue their own interests, assured that the American dependence means that 
it will have to support them regardless of their actions. Even if the allies are not 
reckless, they may become targets for an aggressive  fait accompli-seeking rival 
great power. This chain-gang logic could lead to dangerous situations if the US 
has to strengthen its ties with, for example, Georgia, Taiwan or the Ukraine. Even 
if the US' partners in NATO seems less than enthusiastic about including Georgia 
and the Ukraine into the alliance, nothing can stop the US from forming a bi- or 
multilateral  alliance  on  another  basis  than  NATO,  similar  to  its  current  close 
military relations to, for example, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Qatar.
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7 Transferability
In this chapter, I argue that the working hypothesis based on the historical case is 
applicable to a modern context. I discuss aspects related to interaction capacity, 
economic interdependence, hard power/soft power, norms and the role of public 
opinion, international as well as domestic. 
The transferability concept is based on the methodological approach described 
in chapter 3, in which it is stated that a working hypothesis can be developed 
through the application of a theoretical framework on a single case study. This 
working hypothesis can then be transferred to another context, provided that it is 
sufficiently similar, which by Lincoln & Guba (2007, p. 40) is described as degree 
of fittingness. 
7.1 Interaction Capacity
Buzan & Little (2000, p. 276-299) argue that ”interaction capacity” is a crucial 
component  in  technological  change  and  globalization,  and  that  Waltz  has 
overlooked this aspect of the international system. Interaction capacity determines 
the  ability  of  units  to  interact  and  as  such  is  determined  by  technological 
development  in communications,  infrastructure and related fields.  At a glance, 
one of the most significant differences between 1890-1911 and today would be 
the impact of a drastically improved interaction capacity. However, most of the 
drastic breakthroughs listed by Buzan & Little, for example the sailing ship, the 
steam-driven  iron  and steel  ships,  railways  and  the  electromagnetic  telegraph, 
were already part of everyday life in 1890-1911. Not only did these factors exist, 
they had already started to have a global reach.  For example,  the transoceanic 
cables for telegraphs were laid out in the 1850s and 1860s, meant that messages 
could travel across the world in a single day.  In the early 20th century,  it  also 
became possible to send wireless messages across the Atlantic via radio.
I  argue  that  the  world  around  1900  had  considerable  interaction  capacity, 
albeit in a manner that was more restricted to the political and financial elite. I do 
not propose to say that ordinary people around 1900 had anywhere near the global 
outreach ordinary people have today.  However, I do argue that heads of state, 
senior  decision-makers  and  journalists  could  communicate  effectively  and 
relatively rapidly on a global level as early as the 1870s, thanks to the telegraph 
and from the early 1900s and onward, wireless communications. Trade, goods and 
people moved across the globe on railways and ships. 
Since I work with the international system and states are the actors in this 
thesis, interaction capacity is interesting primarily at the level of the state. Thus, 
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the achievements of the late 19th century created sufficient interaction capacity for 
my arguments to be transferable. Even if a message can be sent in seconds today 
compared  to  hours  at  that  time,  I  argue  that  interaction  on  the  state  level  is 
normally preceded by careful deliberations, which means that differences in terms 
of  interaction  capacity  at  the  state  level  need  to  be  more  significant  than  the 
difference between hours and seconds to have an impact. As such, it can be major 
factor in an analysis  of earlier  stages in history but I argue that it  is of minor 
importance to the study of events from the late 19th century up until today.
7.2 Economic Interdependence
The  concept  of  economic  interdependence  may  be  fairly  recent  but  it  has 
implications stretching back far into history. Waltz, in his analysis of economic 
interdependence, found that the great powers in 1910 were far more dependent of 
trade with each other than, for example, the US was in the 1970s (Waltz 1979, p. 
158-160).  The figures quoted by Waltz  indicate  that  exports  plus imports  as a 
percentage  of  GNP were  33-52% for  the  U.K.,  France,  Germany and Italy  in 
1909-1913  (Waltz  1979,  p.  141).  Putting  these  figures  into  perspective,  the 
equivalent figures for 20086 for the US would be 25%, for the EU 19%7, for China 
62% and for Russia 44% (CIA World Factbook). 
Waltz (1979, p. 158) goes on by quoting John Maynard Keynes, who stated 
that  “[t]he  statistics  of  the  economic  interdependence  of  Germany  and  her 
neighbors are overwhelming”. Germany was “the best customer of six European 
states, including Russia and Italy;  the second best customer of three, including 
Britain; and the third best customer of France”. In addition, Germany was “the 
largest  source  of  supply  for  ten  European  states,  including  Russia,  Austria-
Hungary, and Italy; and the second largest source of supply for three, including 
Britain and France” (Waltz 1979, p. 158). 
This  clearly  shows  the  degree  of  economic  integration  between  the  great 
powers  in  the  early  20th century.  Despite  this,  the  great  powers  clashed  in  a 
monumental  war  which  ravaged  their  economies.  The  historical  record  of 
economic interdependence clearly indicate that it has not proven to be capable of 
discouraging war, even at levels resembling those we have today. The First World 
War also contributed to the demise of economic interdependence in the early 20th 
century.  The economic interdependence during the interwar years of the 1920s 
and 1930s was far less extensive (Waltz 1979, p. 144). 
6 For the modern examples, I have used GDP figures rather than GNP, since GNP figures are usually not listed 
today. The difference between GDP and GNP measurements may have an impact on the precise accuracy of the 
figures but will not have a significant influence on the comparison. For example, for the US, GDP accounted for 
99.2% of the GNP in 2008 (Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States).
7 Excluding imports and exports within the union between EU member countries
39
7.3 Hard Power: Still a Factor
Hyde-Price  (2008,  p.  21)  describes  the  contemporary  optimistic  view  of  the 
international system with the following statement;
International anarchy may not have been ended [...] but its competitive logic has 
been  mitigated  by  pooled  sovereignty,  porous  borders,  multi-level  governance, 
multilateral  institutions,  economic  interdependence  and  transnational  social 
integration.
He goes on by saying that ”the problem” with this description of the world order 
is that ”we have been here before” and that ”[i]n the wake of the Great War of 
1914-18 a similar mood of infectious optimism blossomed throughout Europe and 
North America” (Hyde-Price 2008, p. 21). The League of Nations was organized 
and  the  president  of  US  made  bold  speeches  about  how  justice  and  self-
determination would be the order of the day in global politics. After no more than 
20 years, the optimism was gone and the world once again stood at the brink of 
war,  this  time  the  confrontation  would  be  more  destructive  than  anything 
previously seen. 
Hyde-Price  (2008,  p.  23-24)  identifies  two problems  which  color  both  the 
contemporary optimism and that of the early post-Great War era. The first one is 
what Hyde-Price calls ”presentism”. This is the tendency to overestimate the long-
term impact of contemporary historic events by thinking that the anarchic ”self-
help” system has been replaced by a rule-based ”post-Westphalian” order (Hyde-
Price  2008,  p.  23).  The  second  problem  is  the  tendency  to  downplay  the 
significance of power. Hyde-Price (2008, p. 24) states that  the concept of soft 
power proved empty and toothless when faced by violent conflict, he mentions the 
break-up of Yugoslavia as an example.  Furthermore,  he also mentions that the 
1990s started and ended with two wars, that in the Gulf War and the operations in 
Kosovo (Hyde-Price 2008, p. 24). 
The 2000s have not been significantly different at the time of writing this in 
2009. In 2001, the US supported by a coalition resorted to traditional hard power 
in Afghanistan.  Two years later,  despite considerable international controversy, 
the US launched yet another war, this time in Iraq. The EU deployed some hard 
power of its own in the Democratic Republic of Congo during Operation Artemis 
in 2003 and later again in 2008 in Chad. The Russian operation against Georgia in 
2008 also showed that  even in today's  world,  hard power can trump all  other 
arguments in a quick and effective fashion. 
With this in mind, I argue that hard power is every bit as relevant today as 
ever.  Soft  power has failed to entirely replace its  “hard” counterpart  in global 
politics. When push comes to shove, vital issues are still handled by the military 
forces capable of shouldering such responsibilities. 
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7.4 Norms of the Past and Present
A frequently mentioned criticism against the view that contemporary international 
politics has many similarities with the past is that there is a new mindset in which 
human rights and self-determination are held in much higher esteem than was the 
case in the late 19th and early 20th century. However appealing these views may 
be, I argue that they too are a difference in degree rather than in kind. A similar 
mix of hidden agendas and seemingly noble intentions was present in 1890-1911, 
for example in the form of the mission civilisatrice. This doctrine exemplified the 
ambition  to  spread  civilization  to  the  “savage”  populations  of  the  colonies 
(Hobsbawm 1989, p. 99). According to, for example, Paris (2002, p. 638), modern 
peacebuilding efforts are the modern rendering of the mission civilisatrice. 
The above argument does not intend to reduce the contemporary human rights 
and peacebuilding efforts to the level of imperialist antics but rather to illustrate 
that  during  the  era  of  imperialism,  there  were  widely-held  notions  that 
imperialism  was  in  fact  beneficial  for  the  colonial  subjects.  Even  though  the 
mindset of the time was deeply influenced by ideas of racial superiority, norms 
and international opinion nevertheless played an important role. The rumors of 
British concentration camps in South Africa forced the British authorities to make 
public denials until it was confirmed that Boer women and children were dying in 
the British camps. The outrage in Europe inspired the upper society in Berlin to 
hold  “Boer  parties”  to  support  the  Boer  cause  and Polish  officers  traveled  to 
Transvaal  to enlist  as  volunteers to help the Boers (von Platen 1999, p.  138). 
Other volunteers went all the way from Scandinavia to form the “Scandinavian 
volunteer corps”. In France, the government met with the Boer president Paulus 
Krüger. When the British monarch Edward VII visited France the year after the 
Boer war had come to an end, the public showed its contempt by being utterly 
silent when they had gathered to “greet” the king of Great Britain. 
Similarly, in 1894-1899, the Dreyfus scandal split public opinion in France in 
two. Captain Alfred Dreyfus had been wrongfully accused of treason, chosen to 
be a scapegoat because of his Jewish descent. A considerable part of the public 
was outraged and the whole of Europe got involved.  Germany denounced any 
affiliation with Dreyfus in a remarkably generous gesture intended to demonstrate 
his innocence. Queen Victoria encouraged “the martyr” to appeal and the public 
all over the globe “from Iceland to New Zeeland” [my translation] took sides (von 
Platen 1999, p. 145-177). In the end, the French military court that had sentenced 
Dreyfus had to accept the appeal and changed the sentence, setting Dreyfus free. 
While the Dreyfus scandal and the Boer war were headline news around the 
globe,  the  American  campaign  against  insurgents  on  the  Philippines  after 
replacing Spain as the colonial master of the islands was revealed to be ruthless 
and  brutal.  The  accusations  included  torture  and  massacres.  The  American 
secretary of war Elihu Root publicly stated, with the support of four witnesses, 
that the American army had been nothing but humane and generous. One of the 
witnesses, William H. Taft (later to become president), stated that;
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[...]there never was a war conducted, either against an inferior race or others, in which 
there was more compassion and more restraint and more generosity, assuming there was 
a war at all, than there has been in the Philippines (“Secretary Root Defends Army in 
Philippines”)
The above shows clearly  that  norms,  international  as well  as  domestic,  was a 
factor to be reckoned with even during the ruthless age of imperialism. Even if 
Taft  and  the  others  were  either  lying  or  exaggerating,  the  fact  that  they  felt 
compelled  to  make  such  statements  indicates  the  importance  of  norms  to  the 
public opinion. It is also important to keep in mind that this was the era that saw 
the birth of the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, both intended to provide a 
secular  legal  framework  in  support  of  a  more  humane  world.  The  Geneva 
convention of 1864 is another noteworthy example. The problem was that time 
and time again, noble intentions gave way to ruthless calculation during the 24 
years of gradual escalation between 1890 and 1914. The great powers frequently 
resorted  to  appalling  measures  and then  tried  to  hide  it  from the  public.  The 
international norm system built by the status quo-pursuing diplomats during the 
mid-19th century was undermined, step by step. By 1914, the liberal norms had 
been mostly replaced by belligerent nationalism. 
I  argue  that  the  same  can  be  said  of  today;  although  noble  intentions  are 
widespread, states, and in particular great powers, tend to let security issues take 
precedence over such concerns. This was, for example, the case with the recent 
use of torture and extrajudicial extraditions by the US. In addition, at least two of 
the emerging great powers, Russia and China, have never held human rights in 
high regard to begin with. 
7.5 Transferability Summary
The two cases I have employed are not identical. I argue, however, that they are 
sufficiently  similar to  allow  for  limited,  probabilistic  generalization.  The 
interaction  capacity  argument  is  insufficient  to  dismiss  these  similarities  since 
globalization in trade, economics and politics as well as public opinion and liberal 
norms was already an important factor in 1890-1911. Again, the circumstances 
were not identical but there were key similarities. In fact, I argue that the 1890-
1911 time period is probably more similar to the contemporary situation than, for 
example, the 1950s. In some respects, most notably trade and interdependence, 
1890-1911 is more similar to today than even the 1970s. 
One of the most memorable crimes of the era, the colonial conquest of Africa, 
should  not  be  allowed  to  obscure  the  image  of  the  1890-1911  time  period 
completely. There were nuances, just like there are nuances today. The ruthless 
power politics of 1890-1911 provoked public outrage several times, just as similar 
behavior does today. Ultimately, economic interdependence, international norms 
and  public  opinion  have  proven  to  be  insufficient  to  prevent  the  violent  and 
dangerous policies of the great powers, in the past as well as the present.
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8 Conclusions
The  historical  and  contemporary  empirical  analyses  converge  in  light  of  the 
theoretical framework; in an unbalanced multipolar world order, the incentive for 
power maximization combined with actor prospects of low cooperation benefits 
drives  expansionist  policies.  The  great  powers  then  pursue  both  internal  and 
external  balancing.  The external  balancing is  comprised of alliances,  wars and 
“scrambles” to grab resources, especially those that are available in areas in which 
other great powers have a weak power base. The internal balancing is comprised 
of massive armament programs. During the age of imperialism, the great powers 
tried  to  grab  colonies  and later  undertook  ambitious  military  build-up  efforts, 
among  these  massive  German  naval  investments  stand  out.  Today,  the  great 
powers are trying to grab parts of the Arctic while Russia and China have been 
pursuing extensive re-armament programs for several years, trying to reduce the 
gap in their relative strength vis-à-vis the US. 
8.1 Incentives and Prospects
In both the historical and contemporary cases, power maximization efforts have 
been backed by military power projection displays.  The gunboats of 1911 may 
have been replaced by the strategic bombers and polar patrol vessels of 2007 but 
the pattern remains the same. Even if no shots are fired, they can contribute to 
increased international tension and indicate the start of area-specific (i.e. naval, 
polar, etc.) arms races. 
The current hyperpower will have to cut back on its ambitions and thus cease 
to dominate  global politics.  This will  inevitably create a power vacuum in the 
international system. This in turn will provide opportunities for the re-emergence 
of great power politics. The US has already shown that even today, a sufficiently 
powerful actor can disregard contemporary international norms, ranging from jus 
ad bellum  to torture, and get away with it. Even if it hadn't, the decline of the 
hyperpower means that there is no one to make sure that everyone plays by the 
rules.  As  such,  international  norms  will  need  to  be  accepted  by  all  the  great 
powers  to  be  effective,  unless  an  alliance  steps  forth  to  shoulder  that 
responsibility.
Actor  prospects  can  potentially  make  actors  transcend  the  rational  but 
mutually  undesirable  outcome  inherent  in  short-term/low-trust  contexts,  as 
illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma view of international politics. In both my 
empirical examples, several great powers have chosen the “defect” option rather 
43
than “cooperate” since the relative power balance is to their disadvantage to such 
an extent that it becomes impossible to close the gap through mutual gains. Thus, 
they pursue relative gains as the quickest and most efficient means of closing in 
on their rivals. Such was the case with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the past 
and with Russia and potentially also China in the present. 
In these unbalanced multipolar settings, the asymmetrical allocation of power 
presents  a  significant  potential  for  conflict.  When  the  dominant  power  is 
weakening, the rising great powers may see this as an excellent opportunity to 
expand at its expense, thus making considerable relative power gains.
The differences in actor expectations have a profound impact on the agency 
responses to this type of situation. Whereas some great powers are more cautious, 
preferring  more  peaceful  strategies,  others  are  more  aggressive  and 
confrontational.  For  example,  the  current  Russian  policy  view  of  NATO 
expansion as a security threat to Russia and its interests does not bode well. The 
Russian stated ambition to undermine NATO and increase the transatlantic rift 
between the EU and the US may also become a destabilizing factor in the near 
future.  The  reoccurring  Russian  tendency  to  make  statements  using  neorealist 
terminology by using words like “multipolarity” (Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian  Federation)  and  “great  power”  (Pop  2009)  clearly  illustrates  their 
prospects. Meanwhile, sources of controversy between China and the US remain 
in the form of Chinese backing to rogue states such as Burma and North Korea as 
well as the latent conflict over Taiwan. 
Naturally, it becomes impossible to maintain positive actor expectations on a 
unilateral basis. The aggressive and confrontational great powers will force more 
hostile actor expectations from the other great powers, whether these want to or 
not. In the historical case, Germany and Austria-Hungary greatly contributed to 
the  international  tension  and  forced  the  other  great  powers  to  form alliances, 
thereby severely destabilizing the international environment. In the present case, 
there are strong indications that Russia will continue to pursue similar strategies. 
China's strategy is as of yet quite unclear but it has shown tendencies to pursue 
power maximization and launched an aggressive power projection display, albeit 
in a less drastic form than Russia.
8.2 A Military Perspective
As stated in chapter 6.3, many armed forces today are undergoing a restructuring 
from conventional territorial forces shaped by the demands of the Cold War, to 
smaller,  more  mobile  units  capable  of  deployment  around  the  globe.  The 
peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions of the 1990s and the first decade of the 
2000s have set  the standards  for  this  process.  However,  this  also makes  them 
more  suitable  for  remote  power  projection  and  expeditionary  warfare.  In  this 
sense, they become less similar to the large armies of the Cold War and more like 
the armed forces of 1890-1911. 
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A  process  designed  to  produce  the  advantage  of  having  forces  ready  for 
humanitarian  missions  could  also  have  more  sinister,  volatile  effects.  The 
traditional  military  organizations  have  a  certain  inertia  which  is  now  being 
removed. Quick moves and counter-moves are thus becoming available options.
Power  projection  displays  and  “splendid  little  wars”  are  not  unique  to 
multipolar  constellations.  The  most  crucial  difference,  however,  is  that  in  a 
multipolar setting there are more powers that could potentially make use of these 
hard power tools in more situations without having implicit or explicit approval 
from  other  states.  In  addition,  more  powers  will  be  able  to  take  part  in 
“scrambles”.  These  factors  combined  multiply  the  number  of  potential 
confrontation  situations  and the  number  of  states  capable  of  resorting  to  hard 
power, compared to unipolar or bipolar settings. 
8.3 A Transition Phase?
We may be  experiencing  the  early  phases  of  an unbalanced multipolar  power 
game that could lead to growing tensions and a downward spiral of great power 
rivalry.  The  structural  incentives  are  mostly  determined  by  economic 
development,  the  future  of  which  is  difficult  to  predict  in  a  time  of  global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, the significant Russian and Chinese economic bases 
in terms of labor forces, large export sectors and natural resources may be useful 
assets when the world emerges from the global recession and the more diversified 
US  economy  may  be  burdened  by  debt.  In  addition,  the  pursuit  of  securing 
economically  valuable  assets  may  lead  to  more  future  “scrambles”  and 
consequently to some form of confrontation when scarce resources are subjected 
to claims and counter-claims.
8.4 Predictive Capacity
An analysis based on a probabilistic view of causality can identify regularities. In 
this sense it is similar to a deterministic approach. Regularities can be used for 
limited prediction by virtue of being regular. However, whereas a deterministic 
analysis  that  has  identified  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  can  make  a 
prediction  that  could  hypothetically  be  valid  for  any  context,  a  probabilistic 
approach must be more humble. The nature of probabilistic analysis means that 
any prediction will be subject to probability and as such weaker than law-based 
regularity. 
In addition, if the conclusions from a transferability study such as this were to 
be applied on a number of cases which strongly diverge from the original ones, its 
explanatory  power  would  most  likely  be  weakened  by  intervening  variables. 
However, within the framework of the original probabilistic analysis of this thesis, 
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I argue that the predictive potential of the theoretical framework within the chosen 
time frame is sufficient to be useful. Provided that no dramatic changes in the path 
along which the international structure is developing occur in the following years, 
the  theoretical  framework  should  be  valid  for  prediction  within  this  context. 
There's no clear and sharp boundary between the polar constellations. The current 
situation seems to be a gray area between unipolarity and multipolarity,  which 
means that the working hypothesis is applicable but at the same time, the actors 
are also less confrontational than in a mature multipolar world order. In this gray 
area, all the characteristics of a truly multipolar world order are not yet evident. 
Consequently, international norms and restraint may exercise a stronger lingering 
influence  than  can  be  maintained  over  time.  If  the  world  continues  to  move 
towards  unbalanced  multipolarity,  then  the  working  hypothesis  could  become 
even more useful as time goes by.
8.5 Learning From the Past
The historical context is one of many extremes, not the least in the form of the 
ultimate result, being a long and atrocious global war. Hopefully, things will not 
go that far again. My argument is not that we will repeat the exact mistakes that 
preceded World War I, a global war between the great powers remains highly 
unlikely. However, some patterns are repeating themselves. Hard power is still a 
viable  instrument  for  conducting  foreign  policy.  Power  maximization,  power 
projection  and  “splendid  little  wars”  still  occur.  This  leads  to  growing 
international tension and could vastly increase the risk of military confrontation 
on  a  smaller  but  still  dangerous  scale.  In  addition,  stand-offs  between  great 
powers or their coalitions, such as the potential Russian response to future NATO 
enlargement, could quickly erode into situations that are difficult to predict and 
control,  especially  considering  the  increasing  military  interdependence  and 
potentially reckless allies. Georgia is a good example of this. “Splendid little war” 
ambitions  and chain-ganging alliances  is  arguably  one  of  the  most  dangerous 
combinations,  past  or  present.  Small,  vulnerable  nations  are  prime  targets  for 
“splendid little wars” since they can potentially be defeated in a very short time. If 
a  small,  vulnerable  nation  has  powerful  allies,  the  chain-gang  logic  of  high 
military interdependence combined with the prospect of a potential swift defeat 
can  trigger  a  rapid  escalation.  This  happened when  Serbia  was  threatened  by 
Austria-Hungary in 1914 and could happen in the near future if Georgia joins 
NATO and finds itself clashing with Russia once again. 
The most crucial difference between my theoretical framework and the more 
common brands of neorealism is that it  emphasizes the role of actor prospects. 
Even if structural incentives remain a challenge, as they most likely will for quite 
some  time  to  come,  actors  can  still  influence  how  nations  cope  with  this 
challenge.  With  enough  trust  and  reciprocity,  even  the  risks  of  unbalanced 
multipolarity  could  be  manageable.  An  important  lesson  of  the  past  is  that 
alliances  and  interdependence  is  not  necessarily  a  benevolent  force.  Chain-
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ganging remains a highly dangerous phenomena and one that is exacerbated as 
military interdependence grows in a multipolar setting. If actor prospects are to 
overcome these dangerous incentives, then that implies that statesmen and leaders 
must  be  willing  to  accept  relative  asymmetry  even  when  it  is  to  their 
disadvantage,  rather  than  pursuing  power  maximization.  If  the  leaders  of  the 
world,  especially  those  in  Russia,  are  willing  to  accept  such  terms,  is  yet 
uncertain.  They  would  be  wise  to  remember  the  lessons  of  the  past.  The 
catastrophe of 1914 still serves as a stark reminder of the risks of proceeding too 
far down this path.
47
9 Executive Summary
The  purpose  of  the  thesis  is  to  study  how  multipolarity  affects  the  risk  of 
confrontation in an international context, in particular in the form of wars and 
power projection. The theoretical framework is based on Waltz' (1979) Theory of  
International Politics with an added actor perspective based on game theory as 
defined by Axelrod (1987). The main argument is that the international system 
can be understood as a Prisoner's Dilemma. The payoff matrix  in the Axelrod 
version of the Prisoner's Dilemma forms the basis for understanding the role of 
anarchy in the international system. Actor prospects and the relative balance of 
power then determine how actors decide to react to these incentives;  either by 
pursuing short-term relative gains (in game theory terms: defection) or by seeking 
long-term absolute gains (in game theory terms: cooperation). 
9.1 Assumptions and Purpose
The thesis departs from the idea that the world order is in a state of transition, 
from  unipolar  to  multipolar.  This  notion  has  been  frequently  mentioned  in 
publications  specialized  in  international  affairs,  for  example  The  Economist 
(“Europe:  A  worrying  new  world  order;  Charlemagne”)  and  International  
Relations (Scott 2007, p. 33).
If this is the case, then it beckons the question of what the world can expect 
from modern multipolarity. In search of an answer, the thesis turns to what I argue 
is  the most  similar  previous  time period;  1890-1911. Similar  in  the sense that 
there was a considerable degree of interdependence and similar in the sense that 
the  early  stages  of  globalization  were  already  a  fact.  The  degree  of 
interdependence;  political,  military  and  economic,  makes  it  different  from the 
multipolar 1920s/1930s, which is why I preferred 1890-1911 instead. 
9.2 Theoretical Framework
The  backbone  of  the  theoretical  framework  is  Waltz'  (1979)  Theory  of 
International  Politics. Waltz'  concept  of  system-level  pressures  shaping 
functionally undifferentiated actors is the basis for the definition of the system in 
the framework. Waltz himself did not include an actor perspective into his theory 
but  stated  that  it  could  influence  outcomes.  In  an  attempt  to  overcome  the 
deterministic  actor  perspectives  presented  by  offensive  realism  as  defined  by 
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Mearsheimer (2001), I chose to base my actor perspective on game theory. More 
precisely, I used Axelrod's (1987) theories on actor behavior in iterated games. 
The  game-theoretical  perspective  can  be  used  to  illustrate  the  role  of  relative 
versus absolute gains in Waltz' system-level interaction. Waltz himself mentions 
relative  and  absolute  gains  in  Theory  of  International  Politics  but  doesn't 
elaborate on this aspect. He does, however, state that even when absolute gains 
can be made, each actor must consider how these gains will affect their relative 
balance (Waltz 1979, p. 105). The Prisoner's Dilemma model presents a way of 
conceptualizing this by having actors choose between cooperation and defection. 
In addition, each state should be considered to have a sum of points, representing 
its power. This hypothetical figure represents previous gains and losses. I have not 
included any figures beyond the ones necessary to illustrate the payoff matrix in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma,  simply because I have no theoretical  instruments with 
which to calculate such figures. Consequently, they serve as undefined metaphors.
9.2.1 The Role of Polarity
I argue that the polarity of the system has a major influence on the incentives of 
the great powers in their choice of whether to pursue relative or absolute gains. In 
a unipolar setting, the metaphorical figure representing the power of the dominant 
state  will  be  so  high  that  any  attempt  to  catch  up  will  be  futile  and  even 
dangerous, in the sense that it  may invite countermeasures. Absolute gains are 
thus  favored.  In  a  bipolar  setting,  the  superpowers  will  compete  among 
themselves but maintain a direct or indirect controlling influence over their allies 
and any neutrals. As such, wild grabs for relative gains will be risky in a bipolar 
setting  as  well,  where  stable  relations  with  one  or  both  superpowers  will  be 
preferable. In a balanced multipolar setting where the great powers are close to 
equal  in power,  attempts by one to increase its  lot  will  most  likely provoke a 
response  from  the  others.  Although  more  volatile  than  uni-  and  bipolarity, 
balanced multipolarity nevertheless makes absolute gains a viable option as long 
as all great powers grow at a roughly similar pace. 
Unbalanced multipolarity,  on the other hand, is the most unstable of all the 
four polar constellations. In an unbalanced multipolarity, one great power will be 
considerably  more  powerful  than  the  others  but  not  so  powerful  as  to  be  a 
hyperpower  or  hegemon.  This  makes  it  different  from a  unipolar  setting.  The 
strongest great power may be in a state of decline or on the rise. If it is in decline, 
the other ambitious great powers may be tempted to seize the opportunity to make 
a  grab  for  relative  gains,  thereby  pushing  the  system  closer  to  balanced 
multipolarity, where the great powers will be more equal. If it is on the rise, the 
others  may form an alliance  to intervene before a hyperpower can emerge.  In 
unipolar settings, only one state can use hard power without any restrictions or 
restraint.  In  bipolar  settings,  this  number  is  increased  to  two.  In  multipolar 
settings, that number may be as high as the number of great powers, depending on 
the alliance patterns. This creates a multitude of new possibilities and risks.
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9.2.2 The Role of Hard Power
Since my main concern is with the risks of confrontation,  I have primarily 
been interested in the role of hard power as an instrument of foreign policy. I have 
not studied soft power since I simply do not consider soft power to be a threat to 
international security. My contemporary empirical case illustrates clearly that an 
analysis of hard power is warranted since it still plays a role in the international 
context  as  an  instrument  of  coercion  and  threat/deterrence.  The  working 
hypothesis has identified two major ways in which hard power is put to use in 
support of foreign policy. These are; power projection and “splendid little wars”. 
Power projection is comprised of the use of military assets  for displays  or 
symbolic actions. This may include sending military vessels to foreign ports as a 
form of implicit threat, i.e. “gunboat diplomacy” in older terminology. It may also 
include deliberate violation of other states'  airspace by military aircraft.  Power 
projection is inherently risky since it brings military assets to the fore, which may 
provoke mutually undesirable escalations or contribute to international tension. 
“Splendid little wars” are military campaigns in which a great power identifies 
an opportunity to make significant gains through a short and relatively unbloody 
war, preferably against a weak opponent. The great powers of the past and present 
may  use  this  instrument  to  overthrow  uncooperative  governments  or  to  seize 
territory, among other objectives. A worst-case scenario is that a “splendid little 
war” could provoke a response from another great power or lead to a lengthy war 
of attrition. 
9.3 Methodology
The methodology used is based on the concept of transferability,  as defined by 
Lincoln & Guba (2007). The theoretical framework is applied on a historical case, 
being 1890-1911. This time period was chosen because it is the world order that is 
most similar to the contemporary situation. The starting point is the downfall of 
Bismarck as head of German foreign policy and the end is marked by the Second 
Moroccan Crisis, both key events in the time period leading up to World War I. 
The  argument  for  similarity  is  based  on  polarity,  economic  and  military 
interdependence as well as grade of state-level interaction capacity.  The second 
case  is  a  “snapshot”  of  the  contemporary  situation.  In  temporal  terms,  this  is 
defined as the 2001-2009 time period. The years are chosen to reflect the start of 
the post-9/11 era up until today. 
The  conclusions  from the  historical  case  form the  working  hypothesis,  as 
outlined by Lincoln & Guba. This working hypothesis has then been transferred to 
the modern  context.  I  argue that  the two cases,  while  not  being identical,  are 
sufficiently similar to warrant such a transfer. The conclusions of the application 
of  the  working  hypothesis  to  the  modern  context  are  illustrated  in  the  same 
manner  as the empirical  data  in  the historical  case;  by discussing each aspect 
thematically.  I argue that the result of the methodological  approach is that  the 
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empirical material illustrates that the working hypothesis can explain some of the 
events that have occurred recently and can also provide the basis for probabilistic 
prediction  of  patterns  of  hard  power  use,  provided  that  the  shift  towards 
multipolarity continues. 
9.4 Conclusions
My conclusions are that the theoretical framework is well suited to explain and 
analyze the risks of confrontation as related to polarity. It also provides an actor 
perspective to the theoretical tradition of neorealism, where it is often absent. The 
Prisoner's  Dilemma  payoff  matrix  represents  the  international  state  of  deep 
anarchy as presented by Waltz. At the same time, the model also explains why 
states sometimes pursue absolute gains, such as the status quo policies of the early 
post-Napoleonic 19th century. The incentives vary with polar constellation, with 
unbalanced  multipolarity  being  the  most  volatile  of  the  four.  Actor  prospects, 
however, may overcome the challenge posed by the structural incentive, provided 
that the actors can trust each other to such an extent that mutually beneficial gains 
are preferable to relative ones. 
The theoretical framework introduces two ways of empirically defining power 
maximization through use of hard power; power projection and “splendid little 
wars”.  These  two  phenomena  are  found  in  both  the  historical  case  and  the 
contemporary one. The modern world may be in a state of transition towards a 
more  clear-cut  case  of  unbalanced  multipolarity.  If  this  happens,  then  the 
structural  incentives  will  be more  volatile  than they have been for  nearly  100 
years. This is amplified by the seemingly negative actor prospects that have been 
signaled  by Russia  and possibly also China.  Russia  seems to  be on the same 
course as Germany in the 1890-1911 time period, pursuing aggressive expansive 
policies for maximization of relative gains in an attempt to reduce the asymmetry 
between itself and the US. 
Although this does not have to lead to direct confrontation between Russia and 
the US or any of the American allies, it is already leading to potentially dangerous 
behavior in the Arctic and in Georgia. This kind of hard power use will increase 
international  tension  and  also  influence  the  actor  expectations  of  other  states, 
possibly contributing to a more hostile international environment. The growing 
role of dependence on allies inherent in multipolar constellations further add to 
this problem since the US may become dependent on potentially reckless allies, 
such as Georgia, to such an extent that it may have little power over them but still 
have to defend them. 
The  thesis  ends  with  a  warning.  International  tension,  arms  races  and 
confrontations may not yet be a thing of the past. The structural dangers inherent 
in  multipolarity  must  be  taken  seriously,  as  well  as  the  risks  posed  by 
opportunistic and confrontational actor policies. 
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11 Appendix
Below I have included the contents of the two e-mails listed among the references.
11.1 Burton & West 2009
Obama and the Treatment of Terrorist Suspects
February 4, 2009
By Fred Burton and Ben West
U.S. President  Barack Obama signed an executive  order Feb.  1 approving the 
continued use of renditions by the CIA. The order seems to go against Obama’s 
campaign  promises  to  improve  the  image  of  the  United  States  abroad,  as 
renditions  under  the  Bush  administration  had  drawn  criticism  worldwide, 
especially from members of the European Union. The executive order does not 
necessarily  mean  that  renditions  and  other  tactics  for  dealing  with  terrorist 
suspects will proceed unchanged, however.
Obama came into office promising changes in the way the United States combats 
terrorism. One of these changes was a new emphasis on legal processes and a shift 
away from controversial  methods  of  treating  terrorist  suspects,  like  rendition, 
harsh interrogation techniques and secret prisons. The Obama administration can 
and will roll back some of these tactics, as demonstrated by the president’s Jan. 22 
order to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. But some will continue.
Renditions and the Legal Process
Renditions  are  a  powerful  tool  for  counterterrorism  operations.  They  involve 
agents moving into a foreign country to execute a warrant. Once the fugitive is 
located, agents track, seize and transport him out of the country for interrogations, 
or to stand trial, as in the cases of Lebanese hijacker Fawaz Younis, CIA shooter 
Mir  Amal  Kanzi,  1993 World Trade Center  bombers  Abdel  Basit  (aka Ramzi 
Yousef) and Mahmud Abouhalima, and even Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (aka Carlos 
the Jackal).
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Some of the individuals targeted for renditions have warrants out for their arrest, 
but are taking refuge in countries that either lack the law enforcement capability 
to  capture  them or  cannot  arrest  and  extradite  them for  political  reasons.  By 
contrast,  the renditions where there is no indictment or warrant and where the 
suspect is transported to a secret prison for interrogation and detention without a 
public trial are far more controversial. Renditions of either kind virtually always 
occur  with  the  knowledge  of  the  host  country,  and  usually  with  the  host 
government’s express consent. (Few countries wish to shelter suspected terrorist 
masterminds.)
Renditions thus involve legal questions as much as they do diplomatic questions. 
Before renditions can be carried out, the Washington bureaucracy kicks into full 
swing.  The  U.S.  State  Department  must  consider  the diplomatic  ramifications. 
The ambassador in the host country must consider his or her position and judge 
the  response  of  his  or  her  contacts  in  the  host  country government.  The U.S. 
Justice Department must also sign on. Finally, the agency in charge of actually 
nabbing the suspect must be willing to work within any restrictions imposed by 
any one of the many individuals who must approve the operation.
Even  when  the  government  ultimately  deems  a  rendition  operation  legal, 
numerous factors can still stymie the effort (not least of which is that by the time 
all the necessary approvals have been obtained, the window of opportunity to nab 
the  suspect  might  have  closed).  So  while  Obama’s  executive  order  in  theory 
permits  renditions,  it  is  only  one  part  of  the  whole  process;  the  appropriate 
members of Obama’s administration must also be on board.
Many  members  of  the  Obama  administration  also  served  in  the  Clinton 
administration, which was widely seen as considering all legal ramifications of 
potential renditions before taking any action. As a former deputy attorney general 
in  the  Clinton  administration,  new  Attorney  General  Eric  Holder  enjoyed  a 
reputation for deliberating on renditions to the point of inaction — effectively 
vetoing such operations.
While  an appearance of greater  attention to the law might  come as a relief  to 
many, actors in the field do not have the luxury of endless deliberation and total 
consensus  — they  have  a  narrow window of  opportunity  in  which  to  act  on 
perishable  intelligence.  Assuming  that  Obama’s  administration  acts  with 
deliberation and pursues consensus building (as he himself has emphasized, and 
has demonstrated in the bipartisan nature of his Cabinet selections), the legality of 
renditions might become moot if they are not agreed upon in a timely manner. 
There is  a fine line to walk between efficiency and legality in this  field,  with 
extremes on either side being detrimental to national security.
By their very nature, renditions are ad hoc and rarely fit into a nice, clean process, 
something  that  explains  their  controversial  nature.  They  frequently  occur  in 
countries allied to the United States, meaning the practice falls outside the scope 
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of  war.  And  renditions  resulting  in  suspects’  standing  trial  are  far  less 
controversial than those involving secret prisons, harsh interrogation tactics and 
reliance on third countries to carry out interrogations — tactics disfavored by the 
Obama administration.
Alternatives to Rendition
Apprehending suspects in foreign countries does not always involve controversial 
tactics.  U.S.  counterterrorism  officials  also  use  tactics  abroad  that  are  not 
forbidden under U.S. law, though they might be illegal if used within the United 
States (and could well be illegal in the country where U.S. agents employ them). 
In general, such tactics remain constant as administrations change. These tactics 
include surveillance of foreign targets, ruse operations and economic incentives 
and punishments to encourage cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.
Ruse operations, a less controversial way to apprehend fugitives than renditions, 
involve  deception,  obviating  the  need  to  jump through the  bureaucratic  hoops 
required  for  renditions.  Ruse  operations  involve  luring  suspects  to  a  location 
where U.S. agents can apprehend them legally. This involves persuading targets to 
venture  into international  waters,  for  example,  or even to  travel  to  the United 
States, where U.S. agents lie in wait.
While such tactics avoid the legal complexities surrounding renditions, they are 
extremely difficult to carry out. Suspects worth chasing around the world typically 
are not overly gullible, and know where it is safe to travel. So while there is no 
reason to believe that ruse operations will cease anytime soon, successful ones are 
few and far between.
Sometimes killing a terrorist target is both more efficient and less legally complex 
than renditions or ruse operations. Tactical strikes, such as the unmanned aerial 
vehicle-launched missile strikes against  suspected al Qaeda targets in Pakistan, 
both remove a suspected terrorist target and avoid drawn-out legal processes. Like 
its  predecessor,  the Obama administration apparently sees striking at  al  Qaeda 
targets along the Pakistani-Afghan border as acceptable within the scope of the 
ongoing war in Afghanistan, despite Pakistani protests. The latest such U.S. strike 
came Jan. 23, just three days after Obama took office. Given the administration’s 
presumed hesitation based on legal reservations and an unwillingness to expand 
warfare beyond the Afghan theater, this tactic is unli kely to pop up in other areas 
of the world without a serious threat escalation.
Secret Prisons and Interrogation Issues
Obama on Jan. 22 also ordered the CIA to close its secret  prisons around the 
world that hold detainees without adhering to U.S. legal standards. Because fewer 
than 100 detainees were held in these prisons, however, this is a minor point.
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A different executive order also issued Jan. 22 applied the interrogation guidelines 
outlined in the U.S. military field handbook and the Geneva Conventions to the 
CIA. Obama and Holder also have made it clear that the new administration views 
waterboarding as torture and thus illegal, settling the debate on the matter.
Still, it is only a matter of time before new techniques used by interrogators in the 
field  will  face  questions  of  legality  and  morality.  No  national  leader  can 
micromanage at the field level. Even though the Justice Department and senior 
White  House  officials  in  the  Bush  administration  signed  secret  findings 
authorizing the CIA to conduct  waterboarding in specific  cases, tactical,  field-
level topics do not stick around at the level of national policy for very long.
With secret prisons on the way out, more restrictions on how agents act in the 
field  and  an  expected  decline  in  renditions,  a  greater  U.S.  reliance  on  third 
countries  to carry out  rendition  operations  is  possible.  During the Clinton and 
Bush administrations, countries like Egypt and Jordan were known to cooperate 
with U.S. agencies in detaining and interrogating prisoners.
Critics claimed that relying on third countries exploited a loophole that allowed 
the  United  States  to  see  that  unsavory  acts  were  committed  without  directly 
carrying them out. Obama’s emphasis on using diplomacy to improve the U.S. 
image in the world suggests that his administration will turn to other countries for 
counterterrorism assistance instead of operating unilaterally. Obama already has 
asked for other countries to help out more in Afghanistan (specifically European 
countries).  Obama might  also tap third countries  like  Portugal,  Switzerland or 
Germany to take in detainees leaving Guantanamo who are not sent back to home 
countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the facility’s closure. Working with 
these countries to ensure safe delivery of the detainees out of U.S. custody will 
remove a lightning rod for criticism of the United States in the Muslim world.
Delegating counterterrorism responsibilities to other countries allows the United 
States to avoid the legal complexities inherent in renditions, secret prisons and 
harsh  interrogation.  But  ultimately,  increased  reliance  on  other  countries  with 
different  interests  can  enhance  the  overall  complexity  of  missions.  It  is  also 
important to remember that the United States possesses one of the most capable 
counterterrorism forces in the world, and that other countries simply cannot carry 
out the same missions that the United States does. This is not to say that pursuing 
U.S.  interests  abroad  does  not  call  for  diplomacy  (which  is  one  of  the 
administration’s main tools to fight terror), but that seeking international approval 
and establishing legal cover does reduce efficiency and restrain U.S. capabilities. 
Finding the balance between fighting terror efficiently and remaining within legal 
boundaries will be a key challenge for the Obama administration.
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11.2 Friedman 2008
The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power
August 12, 2008
By George Friedman
The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. 
It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United 
States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential 
conflict  with Iran and a  destabilizing  situation  in  Pakistan.  It  has  no strategic 
ground  forces  in  reserve  and  is  in  no  position  to  intervene  on  the  Russian 
periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the 
Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not 
have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; 
hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had 
already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did 
that Aug. 8.
Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days.
On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across 
the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned 
as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to 
the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged 
down while trying to take the city.  In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully 
secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.
On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored 
and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally 
aligned  with  Russia,  and  Russia  acted  to  prevent  the  region’s  absorption  by 
Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of 
the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were 
themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned 
and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in 
defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the 
Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.
[image excluded]
On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking 
on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The 
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other drive was from Abkhazia,  another secessionist region of Georgia aligned 
with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian 
capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military 
airfields  at  Marneuli  and Vaziani  and appeared  to  have disabled  radars  at  the 
international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 
miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of 
Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.
The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion
In  this  simple  chronicle,  there  is  something  quite  mysterious:  Why  did  the 
Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a 
great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous 
three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were 
routine.  The Georgians might  not have fought well,  but they committed  fairly 
substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and 
supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.
The  United  States  is  Georgia’s  closest  ally.  It  maintained  about  130  military 
advisers  in  Georgia,  along  with  civilian  advisers,  contractors  involved  in  all 
aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is 
inconceivable  that  the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and 
intentions.  It  is  also  inconceivable  that  the  Americans  were  unaware  that  the 
Russians  had  deployed  substantial  forces  on the  South  Ossetian  frontier.  U.S. 
technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned 
aerial  vehicles,  could not  miss  the fact  that  thousands of Russian troops were 
moving  to  forward  positions.  The  Russians  clearly  knew  the  Georgians  were 
ready  to  move.  How  could  the  United  States  not  be  aware  of  the  Russians? 
Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have 
missed the possibility that t he Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian 
invasion to justify its own counterattack?
It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. 
wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to 
defy  it.  This  leaves  two  possibilities.  The  first  is  a  massive  breakdown  in 
intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of 
Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — 
miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The United States, along with other countries, 
has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was 
in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has 
not  seen  Russia  make  a  decisive  military  move  beyond  its  borders  since  the 
Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such 
moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk 
the consequences of an invasion.
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If  this  was  the case,  then it  points  to  the central  reality  of this  situation:  The 
Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. 
They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality,  which was that 
they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. 
As for  risk,  they did  not  view the  invasion  as  risky.  Militarily,  there  was  no 
counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, 
the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to 
them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than 
the Russians needed the Americans.  Moscow’s calculus  was that  this  was the 
moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have 
discussed, and they struck.
The Western Encirclement of Russia
To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the 
Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. 
From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution 
was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw 
Ukraine  into  NATO  and  add  to  the  encirclement  of  Russia.  U.S.  Presidents 
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would 
not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.
That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, 
Hungary and the  Czech Republic  — and again  in  the  2004 expansion,  which 
absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central 
Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet 
Union.
The Russians had tolerated all  that,  but the discussion of including Ukraine in 
NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security.  It would 
have  rendered  Russia  indefensible  and  threatened  to  destabilize  the  Russian 
Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be 
included  as  well,  bringing  NATO  deeper  into  the  Caucasus,  the  Russian 
conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended 
to encircle and break Russia.
The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to 
back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, 
but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War 
II was that,  to prevent conflict,  national borders would not be changed. If that 
principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by 
various  regions  for  independence  from Russia  — might  follow.  The Russians 
publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but 
instead continue its  informal  autonomy,  which was the same thing in practical 
terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.
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From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United 
States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. 
From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe 
were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That 
was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a 
minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the 
Russians,  as  we  said,  the  question  was  how  to  respond.  Having  declined  to 
respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: 
in South Ossetia.
Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If 
Kosovo could be declared independent  under Western sponsorship,  then South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared 
independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States 
and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal 
Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union 
was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet 
state; rather, it  meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a 
situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. 
As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 
miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, 
a  NATO  member.  The  disintegration  of  the  Soviet  Union  had  left  Russia 
surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees 
and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.
Resurrecting the Russian Sphere
Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish 
the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish 
that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the 
Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he 
had to establish that Western guarantees,  including NATO membership,  meant 
nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, 
but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the 
United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being 
under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice.
By  invading  Georgia  as  Russia  did  (competently  if  not  brilliantly),  Putin  re-
established  the  credibility  of  the  Russian  army.  But  far  more  importantly,  by 
doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in 
the  Middle  East,  American  guarantees  have  no  value.  This  lesson  is  not  for 
American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the 
Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson 
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Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United 
States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and 
the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their 
risk, not their security.
The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually 
plays  into  Russian  hands.  The  more  vocal  senior  leaders  are,  the  greater  the 
contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that 
American guarantees are empty talk.
The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United 
States,  the  Middle  East  is  far  more  important  than  the  Caucasus,  and  Iran  is 
particularly  important.  The  United  States  wants  the  Russians  to  participate  in 
sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to 
sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. 
Georgia  is  a  marginal  issue  to  the  United  States;  Iran  is  a  central  issue.  The 
Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only 
in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.
Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy 
away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its 
response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States 
had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate 
the  Russian  response  in  Iran  —  and  possibly  in  Afghanistan  (even  though 
Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).
In  other  words,  the  Russians  have  backed  the  Americans  into  a  corner.  The 
Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent 
upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, 
the  Russians  will  have  demonstrated  that  they  have  resumed  their  role  as  a 
regional  power.  Russia  is  not  a  global  power by any means,  but  a  significant 
regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too 
shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery 
to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear 
ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that 
is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated 
it.
The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This 
is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took 
power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with 
the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the 
Middle  Eastern  wars  have  left  the  United  States  off-balance  and  short  on 
resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The 
Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region 
while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The 
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war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical 
foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire 
for centuries.  The last  15 years  or so were not the new reality,  but simply an 
aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.
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